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ABSTRACT 
FREEWAY REMOVAL IN MILWAUKEE: THREE CASE STUDIES 
by 
Alex Snyder 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda Seligman 
 
 
A growing number of cities are choosing to remove parts of their urban freeway network 
to make room for alternative land uses. This study examines the history of two freeway spurs in 
Milwaukee—the Park East Freeway and Interstate 794—which were both targeted for 
demolition. Park East was demolished in 2002, but Interstate 794, which was considered for 
partial demolition on two separate occasions, was eventually rebuilt. This study asks what the 
cases of Park East and I-794 can tell us about the attributes of a successful freeway teardown 
project. This study traces the history of both freeways from the 1950s to the present, drawing on 
a mix of newspaper coverage, archival sources, planning documents, and relevant scholarly 
studies.  This thesis makes two arguments. First, it argues that the cases of Park East and I-794 
support the idea that freeway removal efforts may need: (1) An adequate window of opportunity; 
(2) a strong advocate for the teardown option; (3) strong business support, and; (4) reasonable 
assurances from teardown proponents that the removal option will “do no harm.”  Second, it 
argues that the I-794 outcome can be partly explained by a major state investment in the freeway 
in the 1990s. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2002, Milwaukee’s Park East Freeway came tumbling down. For three decades, the 
half-mile spur of elevated highway had stood as a relic of an ill-fated attempt to encircle the 
city’s downtown with a freeway loop—a controversial project halted in the 1970s by a mix of 
public opposition, new federal regulations, and litigation. Demolishing Park East had long been 
the goal of Mayor John Norquist and others who viewed the freeway as a physical and economic 
barrier to downtown Milwaukee’s development and growth.  
The fall of Park East marked another milestone in an emerging trend in the United States: 
By the 1990s, freeway removal or relocation projects had taken place in or were underway in 
New York, San Francisco, and Boston, as well Portland, Oregon, and Oakland, California.1 “I 
predict this is just the beginning,” Norquist wrote in 2000, “With property values skyrocketing 
near demolished freeways, urban expressway deconstruction could be one of the biggest public 
works projects of the 21st century.”2 
But Park East is only part of Milwaukee’s freeway removal history. Norquist and others 
had also campaigned for a partial demolition of Interstate 794, a freeway spur that, like Park 
East, also stood as a relic of more optimistic plans. But Norquist’s campaign to tear down I-794 
was met by stiff resistance from state, county, and suburban officials and was eventually 
abandoned in the same deal that sealed Park East’s demise. A decade later, state transportation 
                                                
1. Institute for Transportation and Development Policy and EMBARQ, Life and Death of Urban Highways, 
2012, http://bit.ly/1UwAEqe; City of Seattle, Six Cased Studies of Freeway Removal, Seattle Urban Mobility Plan, 
2008, http://bit.ly/1GVlTcc; Raymond Mohl, “The Expressway Teardown Movement in American Cities: 
Rethinking Postwar Highway Policy in Post-Interstate Era,” Journal of Planning History 11, no. 1 (February, 2012): 
92; Massachusetts Department of Transportation, “The Big Dig,” MassDOT, http://www.massdot.state.ma.us/; Brett 
Jackson, “Replacing Oakland’s Cypress Freeway,” Public Roads, 61, no. 5 (March/April 1998), 
http://1.usa.gov/1PmolJJ. 
2. John Norquist, “Tear it Down!” Blueprint Magazine, Fall 2000. 
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officials fielded a tentative proposal to tear down another part of the freeway. By then, Interstate 
794 was rapidly nearing the end of its structural lifespan, and the cost of rehabilitation work on 
the overbuilt freeway segment was projected to be, in the words of one transportation official, 
“astronomical.”3  But this proposal was also met with stiff resistance, and I-794 was ultimately 
rebuilt rather than dismantled. 
This study asks what the cases of Park East and I-794 tell us about the attributes of a 
successful freeway teardown. It traces the history of both freeways from the 1950s to the present, 
drawing on a mix of newspaper coverage, archival sources, and planning documents, and 
relevant scholarly studies. This thesis makes two arguments. First, it argues that the cases of Park 
East and I-794 support the idea that freeway removal efforts may need: (1) An adequate window 
of opportunity; (2) a strong advocate for the teardown option; (3) strong business support, and; 
(4) reasonable assurances from teardown proponents that the removal option will “do no harm.”  
Second, it argues that the I-794 outcome can be partly explained by a major state investment in 
the freeway in the 1990s. 
The significance of this research is twofold. First, this study examines the Park East 
teardown in a more comprehensive way than has previously been achieved. Park East has been 
widely written about by scholars and non-scholars alike, but perhaps never so comprehensively. 
Second, by studying the case of I-794, this study broadens our understanding of the freeway 
removal trend in the U.S. To date, most of the literature on this topic has focused on successful 
freeway removal projects (with “success” here being defined as a demolished freeway).  
Demolished freeways are, however, only part of the picture; Many freeway segments considered 
                                                
3. Pete Millard, “State Weighs Tearing Down Hoan Bridge,” Milwaukee Business Journal, August 21, 
2008. http://bit.ly/1RuKYda. 
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for demolition have instead been rerouted or rebuilt. Understanding failed removal attempts is an 
important part of understanding the necessary conditions for freeway removal to take place. 
The author believes this research will be of interest to a relatively wide audience, 
including public policymakers and community leaders who have an interest in pursuing a 
freeway teardown project in their communities. This may beg the question: Why would anyone 
want to demolish an urban freeway in the first place? The answer to that question is multifaceted. 
For all their benefits, these highways also create a host of problems and challenges. They are 
sources of noise pollution, air pollution, traffic congestion, and are widely considered to be 
unsightly in their appearance. For all of these reasons, freeways tend to have a depressive effect 
on nearby property values. They consume amounts of urban space that could be used for other 
amenities, such as public parks, residences, and businesses. Urban freeways also create physical 
and psychological barriers between different neighborhoods, especially for non-motorized forms 
of traffic. Finally, they are extremely expensive to maintain and rebuild. 
 
Literature Review 
 
As the number of freeway removal projects grow, so too has interest in the topic as a 
subject of research. This body of research is relatively small, but two generalizations can be 
made. First, this research generally falls into one of two categories: Studies that have measured a 
removal project’s specific impacts—such as traffic impacts or land value prices—and studies 
that have attempted to tease out the attributes of successful removal projects. This study falls into 
the latter category of literature. A third but emerging category places the removal trend within a 
broader historical context. Beyond these categorical classifications, freeway removal research 
  4 
thus far has placed a heavy emphasis on successful freeway removal projects (that is, those that 
proceeded to demolition phase). Relatively little attention has been given to freeways where the 
demolition option was considered but ultimately rejected. By examining the demolition of I-794, 
this study helps fill a gap in the current body of research. 
Thus far, research examining the specific impacts of freeway removal has found only 
positive outcomes. In 2004, for instance, Chang Deok Kang and Robert Cervero examined the 
examined property value impacts from a freeway removal project in Seoul, South Korea. 
Between 2003 and 2005, the municipal government tore down a 9.4 km elevated freeway, 
replacing it with an urban greenway that restored the Cheonggyecheon stream, which resulted in 
a significant and positive impact on housing prices.4 In a similar 2009 study, Cervero, Kang, and 
Kevin Shively examined land value impacts resulting from two freeway removal projects in San 
Francisco—the Embarcadero Freeway, an elevated, double-decker highway 2.6 km in length that 
formerly ran along the waterfront, and the Central Freeway, of which 1 km was removed and 
replaced with the Octavia Boulevard. In both instances, the researchers found that the removal of 
these freeways had a positive impact on nearby land values.5 Finally, in 2013, Jason Billings, 
Norman Garrick, and Nicholas Lownes assessed the travel pattern impacts of three freeway 
removal projects: the Embarcadero Freeway and Central Freeway in San Francisco and the Park 
East Freeway in Milwaukee.6 They found that while these removal projects reduced traffic 
capacity in the corridor, they also had a redistributive effect on traffic, diffusing previously 
concentrated traffic streams over adjacent streets and other freeways. In San Francisco, evidence 
                                                
4. Chang Deok Kang and Robert Cervero, “From Elevated Freeway to Urban Greenway: Land Value 
Impacts of the CGC Project in Seoul, Korea,” Urban Studies 46, no. 13 (2009): 2771-794. 
5. Robert Cervero, Junhee Kang, and Kevin Shively, “From Elevated Freeways to Surface Boulevards: 
Neighborhood and Housing Price Impacts in San Francisco,” Journal of Urbanism 2, no.1 (March 2009): 31-50. 
6. Jason Billings, Norman W. Garrick, and Nicholas E. Lownes, "Changes in Travel Patterns Due to 
Freeway Teardown for Three North American Case Studies." Urban Design International 18, no. 2 (2013): 165-81. 
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suggests some highway users might actually have switched to light rail. In all cases the 
researchers concluded that “the fears involved with removing freeways are unwarranted and that 
overall the changes seem to be beneficial to the city.”7 
In his 2012 article, Raymond Mohl put the urban freeway removal trend in a historical 
context. Mohl chronicled completed removal or relocation projects in six U.S. cities and 
provided overviews of similar projects in progress or under some level of consideration in more 
than a dozen cities.8 Mohl interpreted recent interest in urban freeway removal “as a 
contemporary response to some of the now perceived failures of mid-century urban 
transportation planning and policy.”9 All of this activity, he argued, “suggests the outlines of a 
loosely organized national expressway teardown movement” resulting from “a fundamental shift 
in the nation’s transportation politics.”10 But he noted this movement has thus far only succeeded 
in removing “expendable” freeway segments, such as the remnants of never-finished freeway 
projects. “Realistically,” he wrote, “no one expects that main-line expressways that carry heavy 
auto and truck traffic through metropolitan areas will get torn down.”11  
A final category of research deals with the attributes of successful freeway removal 
projects. This thesis draws on an evaluative framework of “necessary conditions” for freeway 
removal developed within this vein of research.  The initial list of conditions for freeway 
removal was developed by Francesca Napolitan in her 2007 master’s thesis.12 This thesis was 
later condensed into a published article of the same title, co-authored by P. Christopher Zegras, 
                                                
7. Jason Billings, Norman W. Garrick, and Nicholas E. Lownes, "Changes in Travel Patterns Due to 
Freeway Teardown for Three North American Case Studies." Urban Design International 18, no. 2 (2013):181. 
8. Raymond Mohl, “The Expressway Teardown Movement in American Cities: Rethinking Postwar 
Highway Policy in Post-Interstate Era,” Journal of Planning History 11, no. 1 (February, 2012): 89-103. 
9. Ibid., 91.  
10. Ibid., 96. 
11. Ibid., 97. 
12. Francesca Napolitan and P. Christopher Zegras. "Shifting Urban Priorities? Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States." Transportation Research Record, no. 2046 (2008): 68-75. 
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Napolitan’s thesis adviser.13 This literature review relies most heavily on Napolitan’s thesis, 
where core concepts are explained more comprehensively. Napolitan’s list of conditions was 
later expanded in 2009 by Kim Tucker Henry in her own master’s thesis.14 
 
Shifting Urban Priorities (2007) 
In “Shifting Urban Priorities: Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United States,” 
Napolitan worked “towards a theory of highway removal” through three case studies where the 
removal option was considered: the Park East Freeway in Milwaukee (the same freeway 
examined in this thesis), the Central Freeway in San Francisco, and the Whitehurst Freeway in 
Washington D.C.15 As mentioned earlier, Park East was closed for demolition in 2002 following 
a lengthy campaign by the Norquist administration. A terminal portion of San Francisco’s 
Central Freeway, which was damaged in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, was demolished in 
the early 2000s after a lengthy referendum process. In Washington, D.C., the Whitehurst 
Freeway was rebuilt rather than dismantled. Here, “a strong community movement against the 
freeway never really appeared. The movement seemed to have its mind set on a rehabilitation 
scheme, citing primarily cost and traffic concerns.”16  
Drawing on these case studies and explanations of national and international studies of 
large-scale infrastructure projects, Napolitan developed a set of “necessary conditions” for 
                                                
13. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
14. Kim Tucker Henry, “Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the Proposal to Remove 
the Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana” (master’s thesis, University of New 
Orleans, 2009), http://bit.ly/1Ulg3oJ.  
15. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 41, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G.   
16. Francesca Napolitan and P. Christopher Zegras, “Shifting Urban Priorities? Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States,” Transportation Research Record, no. 2046 (2008): 72.  
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freeway removal to occur.  Her basic argument appeared in two forms, which differ from each 
other enough to warrant discussion of both.  First, she argued that: 
 
Urban highway removal will occur in locations where a policy entrepreneur for freeway 
removal exists and a window of opportunity occurs such that they are able to push the 
idea to a wider audience. Once the window has been opened, and the idea of freeway 
removal has gained legitimacy as a valid option, there must be an individual or collective 
group who supports the opportunity cost for removing a freeway in order to benefit in 
another area. Ultimately for the alternative of freeway removal to be selected over other 
alternatives, those in power must value other benefits more than they value the benefits 
associated with freeway infrastructure.17 
 
Later, however, she argued that freeway removal will only take place when 
 
 
(1) the one precondition is met: the condition of the freeway must be such that there is 
concern over its integrity and structural safety, (2) a window of opportunity exists; the 
window may the precondition itself or an event like a public hearing, or planning process, 
or a temporary closure of a roadway, (3) the value of mobility must be lower than other 
objectives such as economic development, quality of life, etc., and (4) those in power 
must value other benefits more than they value the benefits associated with freeway 
infrastructure for the alternative of freeway removal to be selected over other 
alternatives.18 
 
 
There are two major differences between these arguments. The first references a “policy 
entrepreneur,” a condition that is not found in the second. Beyond this, the “value of mobility” 
condition in the second argument does not appear in the first version of the argument, but 
appears closely related to condition (4) which is apparent in both statements.  These concepts 
were defined as follows: 
Integrity and Safety Concerns: Napolitan argued that freeway removal would only gain 
serious consideration if there were concerns about the freeway’s integrity or safety. Both the 
                                                
17. Francesca Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 123, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
18. Ibid., 126-127. 
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Park East and Whitehurst freeways were intact, she argued, but they were nearing the end of 
their structural lifespans and would eventually need to be rebuilt or rehabilitated. San Francisco’s 
Central Freeway, by contrast, was partially damaged in the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake.  
Napolitan described this condition as “precondition”; that is, that it must be in place before 
freeway removal can even be considered. 
Policy Entrepreneur: Napolitan borrowed this concept from political scientist John 
Kingdon, who defined the policy entrepreneur as someone who invests “their resources—time, 
energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return. That return might 
come to them in the form of policies of which they approve, satisfaction from participation, or 
even personal aggrandizement in the form of job security or career promotion.”19 As Napolitan 
noted, “Policy entrepreneurs can be found in many parts of the policy community including 
within government agencies, elected or appointed officials, special interest groups, community 
organizations, and research organizations.”20 Napolitan argued that “Urban highway removal 
will occur in locations where a policy entrepreneur for freeway removal exists and a window of 
opportunity occurs such that they are able to push the idea to a wider audience.”21 In other 
words, the success or failure of a given freeway removal project may well hinge on whether 
there is a leader or group actively advocating for the removal option. 
A Window of Opportunity: A “window of opportunity” was defined as the thing that 
allows the teardown option to gain serious consideration. It can be any number of things, such as 
                                                
19. John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Second Edition (New York: Harper Collins 
College Publishers, 1995), 122, quoted in Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 39-40, 
http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
20.  Francesca Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 40, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
21. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 123, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
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“the precondition itself or an event such as a public hearing, planning process, or temporary 
roadway closure.”22 The window of opportunity for Park East and Whitehurst, she argued, was 
the deteriorating physical condition of the freeway. The window of opportunity for Central 
Freeway was both the freeway’s physical condition and a community-involved planning process. 
Decreased Value of Mobility: Napolitan defined “mobility” as “the quality of moving 
from one point to another. The greater mobility [sic], the greater the ease with which one can 
move around.”23 The 1950s, she argued, was a period in which the goal of enhancing mobility 
was put ahead of all other considerations, including quality of life and environmental concerns.  
But the narrow goal of enhancing mobility came at a high social cost as highways were run 
through neighborhoods, parklands, and environmental corridors. “The anti-freeway revolts of the 
1960s and 1970s,” she wrote, “were a testament to the public's apparent growing value for other 
goods over mobility. Grassroots groups fought to keep freeways out of their neighborhoods in a 
desire to maintain community cohesion and preserve their quality of life.”24 From this 
perspective then, the freeway removal projects represent a continuation of a long-standing 
tension between mobility and other values.25 
Those in Power and What they Value: The term “those in power” was defined as an 
“individual or collective group,” including the voting public.26 In Milwaukee, Napolitan saw 
power as being embodied within Mayor John Norquist and his administration, which 
campaigned to tear down the freeway and succeeding in convincing “governmental officials, 
businessmen and the general public of the benefits of tearing down the Park East Freeway and 
                                                
22. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 126, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
23. Ibid., 26. 
24. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 27, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
25. Ibid., 123. 
26. Ibid., 121. 
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subsequently gained their support.”27 In the case of Central Freeway in San Francisco 
“competing neighborhoods used the referendum process” to decide the fate of the freeway.28 For 
the Whitehurst Freeway, they write that “proponents for freeway removal were not in a position 
of power,” and Mayor Marion Barry and the National Capital Planning Commission opted to 
keep the freeway.29 “Ultimately,” Napolitan wrote, “for the alternative of freeway removal to be 
selected over other alternatives, those in power must value other benefits more than they value 
the benefits associated with freeway infrastructure.”30 
Napolitan and Zegras noted that this theory of freeway removal applies only to freeways 
with limited utility. They suggested that the Whitehurst Freeway might have survived because it 
retained a greater degree of connectivity; it was not merely a stub but part of a loop that allowed 
it to act as a bypass for some commuters and one “with few viable alternatives and difficult 
connections to larger networks on both ends.”31 
 
Deconstructing Elevated Expressways (2009) 
In her 2009 master’s thesis, “Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the 
Proposal to Remove the Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, 
Louisiana,” Kim Tucker Henry expanded Napolitan and Zegras’ conditions.32 Henry theorized 
that freeway removal projects would share many of the same attributes of government-backed 
                                                
27. Francesa Napolitan, “Shifting Urban Priorities: The Removal of Inner City Freeways in the United 
States,” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 122, http://bit.ly/1L9Sc9G. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid., 123. 
31. Francesca Napolitan and P. Christopher Zegras, “Shifting Urban Priorities? Removal of Inner City 
Freeways in the United States,” Transportation Research Record, no. 2046 (2008): 74. 
32. Kim Tucker Henry, “Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the Proposal to Remove 
the Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana” (master’s thesis, University of New 
Orleans, 2009), http://bit.ly/1Ulg3oJ. 
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megaprojects common before 1970.  Her expanded list of necessary conditions for urban 
highway removal drew on Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff’s book Mega-Projects: The 
Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment (which Napolitan also consulted).33 Henry’s 
expanded framework consisted of Napolitan’s list and five additional conditions.  
Specifically, Henry theorized that successful freeway removal projects (1) would have 
strong businesses support; (2) that the teardown would originate from the public sector and be 
“sold” to various constituencies; (3) that the teardown would promise to “do no harm” by 
imposing few (if any) costs to constituencies or local neighborhoods; (4) that negative impacts 
would be greatly mitigated; and (5) a given freeway teardown might be federally-funded, but that 
it would be pursued to accomplish local goals, with little concern for national objectives. Henry’s 
complete evaluative framework appeared as follows: 
 
Table 1 Henry’s Expanded Necessary Conditions 
Necessary Conditions Definition 
Integrity and Safety Concerns Concerns over integrity and safety of structure. 
Window of Opportunity Some event that enables a freeway removal alternative to 
gain serious consideration. 
Decreased Value of Mobility Value of mobility is lower than other objectives such as 
economic development. 
Power Brokers Value of Freeway 
Less than other Benefits 
Power brokers value other benefits more than they value 
the benefits associated with freeway infrastructure. 
Support of Business Enterprises Spearheaded by business enterprises with very direct 
interest at stake  
                                                
33. Alan A. Altshuler and David Luberoff, Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public 
Investment (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
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Public Entrepreneurship Originated in public sector and were then “sold” to 
prospective constituencies. 
“Do No Harm” Principle Not imposing more than trivial costs on neighborhoods or 
the natural environment 
“Mitigated” Negative Impacts Negative impacts “mitigated” as far as possible. 
“Bottom-Up Federalism” Main constituency and support are local, with little if any 
regard for national purposes. May be federally funded. 
Source: Kim Tucker Henry, "Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the Proposal to Remove the 
Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana” (master’s thesis, University of New 
Orleans, 2009), 48. 
 
 
Henry applied this framework to five other freeway removal or relocation projects, 
including Park East in Milwaukee. She was, however, unable to do so for the Claiborne Avenue 
Expressway because the teardown option was still under consideration at the time she wrote her 
thesis. She found that “all conditions were present in the majority of the selected case cities and 
were unanimously consistent across all cases for some conditions.”34 She described the 
Claiborne Avenue Expressway teardown proposal as lacking four of the conditions from her 
framework, including concerns about the freeway’s safety, leadership from local power brokers, 
boosterism from local business leaders, and policy entrepreneurship.35 To date this project has 
not proceeded to demolition and seems unlikely to do so. 
 
This study utilizes a revised list of the “necessary conditions” proposed by Napolitan, 
Zegras, and Henry. Specifically, it evaluates the Park East and I-794 teardown proposals on the 
                                                
34. Kim Tucker Henry, “Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the Proposal to Remove 
the Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana” (master’s thesis, University of New 
Orleans, 2009), 106.  
35. Kim Tucker Henry, “Deconstructing Elevated Expressways: An Evaluation of the Proposal to Remove 
the Interstate 10 Claiborne Avenue Expressway in New Orleans, Louisiana” (master’s thesis, University of New 
Orleans, 2009), 126-127. 
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following criteria: (1) Integrity and safety concerns, (2) decreased value of mobility, (3) window 
of opportunity, (4) policy entrepreneurship, (5) business support, and (6) the proposal’s promise 
to “do no harm” (see table 2). The reader will note that this list excludes several of the conditions 
outlined earlier.  For example, Napolitan’s condition that “those in power must value other 
benefits more than they value the benefits associated with freeway infrastructure” was omitted 
here because it does not seem to tell us much about the attributes of  successful freeway removal 
projects.  Henry’s “‘mitigated’ negative impacts” condition was excluded because this condition 
would be easily satisfied by the “do no harm” condition; after all, if a given teardown promised 
to “do no harm,” then logically, negative impacts would have already been mitigated. Henry’s 
“bottom-up federalism” and “public entrepreneurship” conditions were also excluded because 
their influence on a teardown one way or another was not made clear, nor were they self-evident. 
  
  14 
Table 2 Evaluation Criteria 
Condition Explanation 
Integrity or Safety 
Concerns 
Napolitan suggested that there must be integrity or safety concerns 
before the teardown option could be considered. 
Window of Opportunity Describes an event, process, or condition that allows the teardown 
option to gain serious consideration. Napolitan suggested the 
window of opportunity can be any number of things, such as the 
physical condition of the freeway itself, or a temporary road closure 
or planning process. 
Decreased Value of 
Mobility 
Describes the value of mobility relative to other urban priorities or 
goals, such as economic development or quality of life 
considerations.  Napolitan defined mobility as “the quality of 
moving from one point to another.” 
Policy Entrepreneur 
 
Someone who invests their resources in a particular cause in the 
hope of some future return. We might expect to find that teardown 
proposals spearheaded by a persistent and well-connected advocate 
or group of advocates tend to succeed and that those teardown 
proposals lacking a clear policy entrepreneur tend to fail. 
Support of Business 
Enterprises 
Henry theorized that business support might be a key component of 
any teardown effort. 
“Do No Harm” Principle 
 
Henry argued that the successful teardown proposal would embody 
a principal of “do no harm.” If this proves to be a key condition of 
freeway removal projects, we would expect to find that the freeways 
are only demolished when it has been shown that the removal option 
will not result in significant traffic congestion or jeopardize major 
business interests. 
 
Ultimately, Napolitan’s “value of mobility” condition did not prove to be a useful 
condition by which to analyze any of the teardown proposals in this study. There are several 
reasons for this. First, there is a problem with how the term “mobility” was used, which was 
defined as “the quality of moving from one point to another.”36 The looseness of this definition 
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aside, this term clearly cannot refer to a general quality of movement because freeways cater 
exclusively to motor vehicle traffic and exclude other forms of movement (such as bicycle and 
pedestrian traffic).  Thus, what Napolitan refers to as “mobility” would be more accurately 
referred to as auto-mobility. 
This leads to a second problem, which is that it is too simplistic to suggest that a 
reduction in urban freeway miles automatically equates to a reduction in mobility. As readers 
will see in Chapter 3, some stakeholders viewed Park East and I-794 as barriers—albeit largely 
psychological ones—to pedestrian movement between Milwaukee’s central business district and 
adjacent neighborhoods. Although one could argue that the Park East teardown harmed the 
mobility of some Milwaukee motorists, this loss of mobility potentially resulted in a gains for 
non-motorized forms of mobility. Thus, it would be too simplistic to suggest that the demolition 
of freeway infrastructure automatically reduces a city’s overall level of mobility. 
Finally, there is little evidence to suggest that there was an overall reduction in the value 
of (auto)mobility. Certainly, if we only consider the views of Mayor John Norquist, his planning 
director Peter Park, and other urban freeway critics who were tied to the project, there would 
seem to be some evidence to suggest the teardown of Park East was marked by a decrease in the 
value of auto-mobility. But what of other stakeholders involved in the project? It would be 
inaccurate to suggest that they also had viewed auto-mobility the same way. Take for example 
former Governor Tommy Thompson, who played a significant leader in the 1999 agreement to 
tear down Park East. Thompson’s propensity for highway-building and expansion projects has 
been well-documented. As James Conant, professor of government and politics, noted, 
“transportation was a particular interest of Tommy Thompson. Road building was an area where 
he could reward those who supported him, and he aggressively pushed his road-building 
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agenda.”37 Even Napolitan acknowledged this. “We might question,” she noted, “whether a true 
change in the value of mobility occurred or whether the mobility value was simply ‘shifted’ to 
another part of the metropolitan area” because the Park East deal included concessions for 
expanded automobile infrastructure by way of a rebuilt (and expanded) downtown interchange.38 
This thesis contributes to freeway removal research in three ways. First, it tests a slightly 
modified version of the existing freeway removal evaluative framework. Second, it enhances the 
scholarly understanding of the current freeway teardown trend in the U.S. by examining two 
instances in which the teardown option was rejected. Finally, it examines the Park East teardown 
in considerably greater detail than has been previously attempted. 
 
Organization of Study 
 
This study is organized into two parts. Part 1 provides the necessary background 
information to contextualize and evaluate the Park East and I-794 teardown proposals. Following 
this introduction, chapter 1 provides a brief overview of Milwaukee’s freeway revolt with an 
emphasis on how it affected Park East and I-794. Chapter 2 examines the building of Lake 
Parkway, a 3.8-mile state highway that extends I-794’s reach into Milwaukee’s southeastern 
suburbs. Fully understanding the history of this state highway extension is important to 
understanding reactions to later I-794 teardown proposals. 
 Part 2 of this thesis examines the teardown efforts themselves. Chapter 3 summarizes 
early efforts to tear down Park East and a portion of I-794. Chapter 4 examines a final proposal 
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to tear down the north-south (Hoan Bridge) segment of I-794 a decade later. The conclusion 
evaluates each teardown attempt within the aforementioned evaluative framework and considers 
the future of I-794 and Lake Parkway. 
Limitations 
 
As with any case study, there are some limitations. First, the cases of Park East and I-794 
are highly suggestive—and support some aspects of teardown theory—but the findings of this 
study may not be generalizable to all teardown efforts; more case studies are needed, especially 
those dealing with lesser-known removal projects and unsuccessful teardown attempts. Second, 
these findings may also be temporally specific. As values and beliefs about transportation 
options change over time, we may find that the political, economic, and technical resources 
needed to execute freeway removal projects also change.  
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Chapter 1 
Park East and Lake Freeway in Milwaukee’s Freeway Revolt, 1958-1982 
 
 This chapter traces the history of the construction of Park East and I-794 from the 1950s 
through the early 1980s—a period of time covering Milwaukee’s “golden age” of freeway 
construction as well as the city’s freeway revolt. Both Park East and I-794 were relatively late 
additions to the county’s expressway and relatively short in length, although planners extended 
both roadways in subsequent years. Like many other latecomers, both Park East and I-794 were 
met by significant public opposition, which succeeded in greatly curtailing plans for both 
roadways. By the early 1980s, both roadways stood as unfinished relics of more optimistic plans. 
They became, in a very real sense, highways to nowhere. Park East ended abruptly in the 
corridor that had been wiped clear of houses for the unbuilt portion highway. I-794 dumped 
traffic into a quiet neighborhood in southeastern Milwaukee. Lacking connectivity to both the 
broader freeway system and any real significance as destination connectors, the better part of 
both freeways carried relatively light traffic. As this chapter will show, the freeway revolt that 
had halted Park East and I-794, effectively set the stage for later removal efforts. 
 
Planning for Milwaukee’s freeway system was initiated in the 1940s in response to rising 
motor vehicle congestion resulting from a post-war boom in automobile sales. Between 1945 and 
1953, motor vehicle ownership in the City of Milwaukee increased by 61 percent.1 Rising 
congestion was resulting in longer commutes, higher crash rates, and, some contended, a general 
economic loss to the city. “If substantial additions to traffic ways are not provided within the 
                                                
1. Richard Cutler, Greater Milwaukee’s Growing Pains, 1960, 2000: An Insider’s View (Milwaukee, WI: 
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next few years,” one consulting firm warned the City of Milwaukee in the early 1950s, 
“motorists will experience rapidly increasing delays and accidents. Additional congestion would 
bring further economic loses diffused throughout every segment of the local economy, and result 
in noticeably accelerated depreciation in property values.”2 
  Milwaukee’s freeway program started slowly but soon picked up pace. Construction on 
the initial mileage started in the early 1950s under the charge of the city. In 1954, the city turned 
over responsibility for building freeways to Milwaukee County, and its newly-created 
expressway commission.3 In 1956, the county freeway program received a major boost with the 
creation of the Federal Interstate System. Urban freeways added to the interstate system were 
eligible for a 90 percent federal construction subsidy. Under this arrangement, progress on the 
county’s planned system proceeded rapidly. Between 1962 and 1967, the county built an average 
of 9.5 miles of freeway annually.4 
The Park East and I-794 freeways were both late additions to the Milwaukee County’s 
freeway plans. Park East debuted in the county’s expressway plans in 1958 as the “Northbelt 
Expressway.” It extended from the city’s North-South Expressway (today I-43) just north of 
Milwaukee’s central business district, easterly towards Lake Michigan.5 It was added to the 
system “to provide greater access to the central business district and to relieve the anticipated 
traffic overload on the Central Interchange sections of the North-South and East-West 
Expressways.”6 In 1964, both the Northbelt Expressway, along with its westerly cousin, the 
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North Avenue Expressway, together became the Park Freeway.7 By the early 1970s, the easterly 
extension of this freeway was commonly referred to as Park East; the westerly extension was 
referred to as Park West. 
The early genealogy of Interstate 794 is a bit more complicated. The east-west portion of 
I-794 dates to some of the county’s earliest plans and was originally part of the East-West 
Freeway (today I-94).8 The North-South portion of I-794 was added to the county’s planned 
system in 1963 as the “Lakefront Expressway.”9 The addition of the Lakefront Expressway, later 
shortened to Lake Freeway, promised to fulfill a long-held dream of many south shore residents 
and suburbanites who desired a more direct route to Milwaukee’s downtown. Talk of such a 
connection dated to at least the 1930s.10 It remained a matter of debate, however, whether such a 
connection should span the mouth of the city’s inner harbor via a high-level bridge or lift bridge 
or whether it should tunnel under the harbor or skirt along the water’s edge.11 
Freeway planners scored a major victory in July 1964, when Lake Freeway and a portion 
of the East-West Freeway were added to the interstate system under the designation of Interstate 
794, thus ensuring the federal government would cover 90 percent of the freeway’s cost.12 Local 
freeway planners appear to have secured this interstate designation based on Milwaukee’s 
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industrial significance at the time and the fact that I-794 would provide a highway connection to 
the city’s port. Although now an aging “rust belt” city, Milwaukee was still a major industrial 
and shipping center in 1964. It was the 11th largest city in the United States, surpassing cities 
such as San Francisco and Dallas, and the county of Milwaukee ranked ninth in the nation in 
terms of industrial production. Milwaukee’s port was also booming; it ranked second in the 
nation in terms of overseas exports and fifth in overall tonnage. In 1964 it processed more than 
6.2 million tons of cargo—a 41 percent increase over the previous year.13 
The interstate designation came with some conditions, however. The state of Wisconsin 
was required to build, “satisfactory connections … both south and north of the Interstate spur” 
and that construction on these connections would be started “prior to or concurrently with the 
construction of the Interstate spur.”14 Specifically, these connections consisted of a “connection 
to the existing street system at the south end of the Lake Freeway in the vicinity of Lincoln 
Avenue” and a “connection at the north end to connect to the North Belt [i.e., Park East] 
Freeway.”15 The latter of these conditions referred to a plan to encircle the city’s central business 
district with freeways also unveiled in 1964. This plan involved extending Lake Freeway north 
from its terminus southeast of downtown to a linkup point with Park East in Juneau Park. The 
other three sides of the freeway loop would consist of the east-west leg of I-794, the north-south 
freeway, and Park East. Many believed this freeway loop was necessary to bolster the city’s 
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central business district in the new motor age.16 “If the area grows as predicted, the number of 
vehicles entering Downtown in future years will increase substantially,” a consulting firm 
cautioned the city in 1964. “Such an increase, if forced onto existing streets, would create such 
serious congestion that the growth would be greatly inhibited if not prevented entirely.”17 
Encircling downtown with freeways, they argued, would help usher the city’s central business 
district into a new period of growth by allowing motorists to traverse the area without ever using 
a local street, thereby reducing travel times and congestion on local streets.18 
Steady progress was made on Milwaukee’s freeway system until the late 1960s, at which 
point several intervening factors dampened future prospects. New federal laws required greater 
relocation assistance to displaced families and that more consideration be given to the 
environmental impact of each new roadway. At the local level, Milwaukee County, which had 
previously advanced unlimited funding for the county freeway program, was now faced with a 
“soaring” budget and capped yearly spending at $8.3 million annually ($56.7 million in 2015 
dollars). “Funding will now control progress,” the commission noted in its 1968 annual report.19  
Public opposition to freeway building was also starting to coalesce. By the late 1960s, freeway 
projects across the nation were hitting roadblocks as angry citizens fought to save their 
communities, parks, and cities. By 1968, urban freeway projects were under fire in at least 25 
cities across the nation, from Boston to Los Angeles.20 The protests and lawsuits that were born 
from this unrest collectively became known as America’s “freeway revolt.” In Milwaukee, 
discontent concerning the county’s freeway program was tied to a number of issues, including 
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the destruction of affordable housing, low payments to displaced homeowners for their property, 
and a planning process that kept exact highway alignments secret until late in the process.21 
Between 1959 and 1971, Milwaukee County’s freeway program destroyed more than 6,300 
housing units and displaced almost 20,000 people.22  
While freeway opponents made their feelings known at the local level, a quiet but 
equally-significant revolt was taking place among policymakers in Washington. Indeed, as 
several historians have demonstrated, freeway opponents were usually only successful to the 
extent they were willing or able to take their fight to the courtroom.23 Several significant pieces 
of legislation—including the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1966, the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969—created legal 
avenues for freeway opponents to stall or block contentious urban highways. 
In Milwaukee, public sentiment hostile to the Park East and Lake Freeway first emerged 
in the mid-1960s.24 In April 1966, eastside attorney Malcom K. Whyte launched an appeal to 
county officials to reconsider the need for the Park East Freeway, which he characterized as a 
“wasteful, harmful, and extravagant project.”25 Although Whyte’s initial pleas failed to sway 
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county officials, he succeeded in rallying members of the public sympathetic to his cause, and 
the Lakefront Preservation Committee was later formed. Over the next year, Whyte and his 
associates appealed to government officials at all levels, raised questions about the freeway’s 
necessity, and expressed concerns about its impact on the lakefront.26 Ultimately, however, these 
efforts failed to halt the road; the Lakefront Preservation Committee disbanded in early 1967 
after suffering a stunning defeat in a city referendum the organization itself had forced through 
signature-gathering.27 
For its part, the county expressway commission continued to defend the freeway, 
insisting that, “All reasonable alternatives had been analyzed during a decade of design 
development, agency reviews, public hearings, and resulting approvals.”28 They argued that 
existing freeway facilities would be unable to serve projected traffic levels and that traffic 
congestion, if unchecked, would threaten the economic well-being of the city.29 Proponents of 
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the freeway also pointed to the agreement with federal highway authorities regarding Lake 
Freeway, which stipulated that the state was obligated to connect the harbor bridge at its northern 
and southern termini.30 
At about this same time, the southern part of the Lake Freeway encountered its own 
difficulties. In the mid-1960s, Milwaukee County approved a southerly extension of Lake 
Freeway from its terminus at the southern tip of Jones Island to Layton Avenue, some 3.5 miles 
further south.31 This extension had come as part of an agreement with the Federal Bureau of 
Public Roads as part of the conditions for part of Lake Freeway (I-794) being added to the 
interstate system.32 At about this same time, the Southeast Regional Planning Commission 
(SEWRPC), which had recently become the regional transportation planning organization for the 
Milwaukee metropolitan area, recommended extending the freeway further still to the Illinois 
State line.33 These plans, however, came under fire from various stakeholders over a variety of 
issues, including the freeway’s anticipated impact on county parklands, as well as the loss of 
homes and impact on property tax revenue.34 
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 The early 1970s proved to be a pivotal time for both Park East and Lake freeways. 
Although Whyte’s organization had long since disbanded, public opposition to the freeways had 
not. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s various unsuccessful attempts were made to stop the 
Park East Freeway, including two federal lawsuits.35 Progress on the freeway continued, 
however, and by the end of 1971 nearly all of the properties needed for Park East had been 
acquired and cleared, leaving a long, vacant scar through the city’s eastside.36 The portion of 
Park East Freeway that was actually built was completed in stages between 1968 and 1971, with 
the second half scheduled to open by 1974.37 That September, however, a new coalition of 
community organizations known as the Lakefront Defense Committee filed a lawsuit in state 
court on the grounds that land in Juneau Park could not be used for the freeway.38  
The linchpin of this lawsuit was a 1936 agreement between the city and county in which 
the city had conveyed use of land (which at the time was submerged beneath Lake Michigan) to 
the county to “be used exclusively as a public park, parkway, amusement or recreation 
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grounds.”39 This agreement further stipulated that were this land ever used for anything other 
than park purposes, ownership would revert back to the city.40 In April 1972, the presiding judge 
granted a permanent injunction against the construction of Lake Freeway through Juneau Park.41 
The first court decision was appealed to the state Supreme Court, which then modified the ruling 
to stipulate that the freeway could proceed—but only if the county were to acquire the city’s 
interest in the contested property.42 
Both sides claimed victory, but the ruling ultimately favored freeway opponents.43 By 
1973, the city had already proved unwilling to deed the necessary land to the county.44 
Additionally, a 1971 federal Supreme Court ruling had stipulated that freeways could traverse 
public parkland where no other reasonable alternatives existed.45 Early the following year, 
federal transportation and land management officials expressed dissatisfaction with the existing 
plan to route Lake Freeway through Juneau Park. They encouraged local authorities to reconsider 
previously dismissed alternatives, give more weight to public opinion, and explore creative ways 
to deal with motor vehicle traffic.46 Freeway supporters hatched various plans for circumventing 
the Juneau Park impasse, including proposals to tunnel under Juneau Park, make use of an 
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abandoned rail corridor to the west, or cap the freeway with an artificial slope from an 
overlooking bluff.47 None of these plans, however, ever came to fruition. 
Even as momentum for Lake Freeway sputtered and stalled, work began on the federally-
funded harbor bridge. This came as a surprising twist, considering the earlier requirement that 
the freeway segment would only be built if the state had started its required highway 
connections. But in 1965, state highway office had requested that the Bureau of Public Roads 
“remove all conditions placed upon the approval of the Lake Freeway.”48 They did just that—
state highway officials having apparently given enough assurances they would adhere to their 
side of the deal. Construction on the harbor bridge began in 1970 and continued through 1974. 
The bridge was largely finished at that point, but it still missing key road connections on both 
ends.49 Those were either already underway or initiated in 1976, and the bridge opened to motor 
vehicle traffic the following year, dedicated as the “Daniel Webster Hoan Memorial Bridge,” 
after the city’s second socialist mayor.50  
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When the Hoan Bridge opened, only 14,500 vehicles per day used the new facility—a 
low figure for the six-lane facility designed to carry upwards of 100,000 vehicles daily.51 A year 
later, usage had climbed to 18,900 vehicles per day, but that was still less than a fifth of the 
bridge’s maximum design capacity.52 Meanwhile, a mile to the west, Interstate 94 carried 
114,000 vehicles per day.53 Those involved with the project often downplayed the lack of traffic. 
“We never anticipated that the facility would operate at its capacity until the freeway is 
extended,” said the deputy director for the county’s public works department.54 The county 
expressway and transportation commission asserted a more optimistic view, insisting the traffic 
numbers passing over the bridge were actually “a remarkable record indicating the need for this 
facility is real.”55 It was, however, hard to disguise the true nature of the highway spur. In the 
mid-1970s, the Hoan had gained a reputation as Milwaukee’s “bridge to nowhere”; it was a 
reputation the bridge retained even after opening to traffic.56 
The demise of the downtown freeway loop and southerly extension of Lake Freeway 
sputtered and gradually died. In 1977, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) rejected the 
Lake Freeway’s environmental impact statement, indicating local planners needed to give more 
consideration to the freeway’s impact on parklands.57 The FHWA also indicated that the 
southern leg of the freeway would not be approved until an acceptable impact statement for the 
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northern section had been completed.58 State money for freeway construction had largely dried 
up. In June 1981, SEWRPC finally scrapped plans for Lake Freeway’s southerly extension, 
substituting in its place “a four-lane limited access surface arterial highway facility” extending 
from the southern tip of the Hoan Bridge to an arterial street some three miles to the south, 
paralleling an active rail line. From here, the roadway would continue to the Illinois state line 
through the corridor of the never-built Lake Freeway.59 Meanwhile, Milwaukee’s downtown 
loop gradually lost supporters and finally died.60 In March 1982, the Wisconsin State Assembly 
passed a bill scrapping the unbuilt portion of Park East and another bill that scrapped the unbuilt 
portion of the Lake Freeway.61 Both bills were signed into law the following month.62 
Thus, by the early 1980s, the stage had largely been set for later freeway teardown 
efforts. A combination of local opposition and shifting national legislation had halted both Park 
East and I-794. By the early 1980s, both the Park East and I-794 freeways stood as monuments 
to much more optimistic plans, carrying only a fraction of the traffic for which they had been 
designed. But although the county’s freeway program was essentially over, investment in I-794 
was not. 
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Chapter 2 
Building Lake Parkway, 1978–2000 
 
This chapter explores the story of Lake Parkway, a 3.8-mile state highway extension of I-
794. Initially known as “Lake Arterial,” this four-lane, controlled access highway marked an 
import shift in the significance of I-794. Before Lake Parkway, the majority of I-794 had served 
little purpose either as transportation facility or as an economic development tool; it carried 
relatively low volumes of traffic for its size and dead-ended awkwardly in a quiet Milwaukee 
neighborhood. Lake Parkway, however, radically altered the function of the I-794 corridor. The 
parkway extended the interstate spur’s reach into Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs, 
dramatically increasing the amount of daily traffic that passed over the freeway’s Hoan Bridge. 
The parkway also transformed I-794 into an economic development tool. The parkway provided 
certain suburban communities with quicker access to Milwaukee’s central business district and to 
the interstate system, which quickly became major selling points for many businesses, 
developers, and would-be residents. The freeway that had once gone nowhere, now went 
somewhere—bringing benefits to the suburbs. In a very real sense, the building of Lake Parkway 
created the suburban stakeholder group that would later rally to defeat both I-794 teardown 
proposals. 
 
 
To the casual observer, the scrapping of the unbuilt parts of Park East and Lake Freeway 
in the early 1980s might seem to have signaled the end of the road for both freeways. But in the 
case of I-794, the story was not quite over. Although a southerly extension of I-794 via Lake 
Freeway was no longer politically or fiscally viable, some planners and politicians at the county 
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and state level continued to push for an extension of the freeway by way of a state highway. In 
fact, this push began even before the state had officially scrapped plans for the southern 
extension of Lake Freeway. In August 1978, the secretary of Wisconsin’s transportation 
department advised SEWRPC that while it supported a southerly extension of I-794 via Lake 
Freeway, it would be at least another decade before the department had enough money to build 
this highway.1 Instead, the secretary suggested that the commission explore non-freeway 
alternatives.2 Harout Sanasarian, a county supervisor and SEWRPC commissioner, immediately 
initiated the push for this less expensive roadway.3 
The impulse to extend I-794 further south lingered for several political and pragmatic 
reasons. Of practical concern, the Hoan Bridge dumped traffic onto residential streets, irritating 
local residents and causing traffic problems.4 The original 1960s agreement between federal and 
state highway authorities had stipulated that the Hoan Bridge would receive an adequate road 
connection at its southern end. In fact, as early as 1974, Robert Paddock, the federal highway 
official who had been involved in the freeway’s authorization, had threatened to recoup the 
federal investment in I-794 if such a connection was not made.5 
 Much like the earlier Lake Freeway, placing an arterial highway at the southern end of 
the Hoan Bridge proved to be a contentious proposition. Many residents in Milwaukee’s Bay 
View neighborhood and the City of St. Francis opposed the roadway for the pollution, excessive 
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noise, and extra traffic they felt it would bring.6 For some, the planned highway extension 
brought a sense of déjà vu. “We’re going through the same thing we went through in 1967 with 
the freeway,” an exasperated St. Francis resident explained at a planning meeting. “I thought this 
was a dead issue.”7 
But the issue was far from dead. By 1984, state plans called for a 3.1-mile, four or five 
lane controlled-access highway, complete with noise barriers for much of the way, stretching 
from the Hoan Bridge’s southern terminus to Layton Avenue to the south, following the 
aforementioned rail corridor.8 Supporters of the highway attempted to downplay the planned 
roadway’s striking similarities to a freeway, pointing to subtle differences in roadway design and 
the road’s planned lower speed limit. Not everyone was convinced. “It is being called an 
arterial,” one resident observed, “but it has many of the aspects a freeway would have.”9 
The highway almost did not survive its initial planning phase. In 1985, the state 
legislature’s Joint Finance Committee axed the highway’s design and engineering funds from the 
state budget, instead directing the state’s transportation department to build a short connection 
between I-794 and a nearby arterial street.10 Had such a mandate been executed, it might well 
have met the letter—though perhaps not the intent—of the original 1960s highway agreement.11  
One of the politicians behind this purse-string attack was a young assemblyman who 
would later become Milwaukee mayor. In 1974, John Norquist was elected to the Wisconsin 
State Assembly at the age of 25. By 1977 he was one of 19 state legislators—most of whom 
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were young and college-educated—who had been instrumental in stopping two controversial 
freeway projects in Milwaukee. Norquist and his colleagues believed that urban freeways were 
undercutting the vitality of cities by incentivizing suburban living and siphoning off the city’s 
middle class residents. They were also critical of SEWRPC, which they believed held a suburban 
bias and characterized as being mostly concerned with cutting the commute times of 
suburbanites.12 “Why do we have to make living in the suburbs so attractive?” asked one of 
Norquist’s colleagues. “The planners say the freeways are a way into the city; we say they are a 
way out of the city.”13 
In the end, the legislature’s attack on Lake Arterial was only temporarily successful. 
Governor Tony Earl vetoed the assembly’s directive to connect the freeway to an existing 
arterial, calling the committee’s language “too restrictive.”14 Shortly thereafter, Frank Mayer, the 
Wisconsin administrator for the FHWA, reminded the state of its earlier agreement to provide an 
arterial link to the interstate spur at its southern end and urged the state to continue to push the 
Lake Arterial. “Any unilateral action to do otherwise at this time would raise serious questions 
with respect to the Sate of Wisconsin’s intent to fulfill the prior commitment,” he said. “Should 
that situation occur, FHWA would have no choice but to require reimbursement of Federal-aid 
Interstate highway funds invested in I-794.”15 
From the FHWA’s perspective, the north-south part of I-794 had been approved for the 
interstate system on the premise that it would provide adequate highway connections to the north 
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and south. In 1983, however, with the freeway loop dead, the FHWA had indicated that stub-end 
treatments at the north and a four-lane highway connection to the south would fulfill this 
obligation.16 But no such leniency was extended to the southern part of the freeway. If the State 
of Wisconsin was now unwilling to build the agreed roadway connection, Mayer cautioned, then 
I-794 would be removed from the interstate system, and Wisconsin would have to repay the 
federal government’s investment in the north-south portion of I-794—estimated at $59.2 
million.17 
Repayment was not even the only issue at stake. In a letter to a county supervisor, Mayer 
also threatened to block the county from completing a planned lakefront park and parking garage 
structure (today the O’Donnell Park structure). This structure required the use of land purchased 
by the federal government for the Juneau Park portion of Lake Freeway. “We cannot make any 
final decision regarding the disposition of these lands,” Mayer wrote, “until the commitment on 
the south end of the Hoan Bridge and the payback question is resolved.”18 Mayer later attempted 
to soften his threats by saying that repayment would be a measure of “last resort.”19 
Mayer’s letters suggest repayment was largely a black-and-white issue, but an internal 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WisDOT) analysis painted a more complicate picture. 
Never made public, this analysis questioned whether a binding contractual agreement with 
federal highway officials had ever existed, especially since the original enforcement mechanism 
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of the agreement—that is, the withholding of federal funds—had been lifted in 1965 without 
additional conditions.20 This analysis also questioned the legal and historical precedent of 
requiring repayment.21 There was, in the words of one highway official, little “benefit which 
could conceivably accrue to the FHWA from forcing the issue.”22 Moreover, even if the FHWA 
did force a repayment, one WisDOT employee showed how the department could shuffle money 
between various state projects and programs to substantially soften the blow of a federal 
repayment.23 Ultimately, this careful and thorough analysis of the situation never made it into the 
public eye. For many, Lake Parkway seemed to be a scenario with two possible outcomes: build 
Lake Parkway or prepare for a federal repayment. 
Mayer’s repayment threat provided the perfect impetus for Lake Arterial proponents to 
renew their push for the highway.24 In 1986, SEWRPC created a task force “to guide a citizen-
based effort to seek a consensus as to how to resolve traffic problems while preserving 
community values,” in affected neighborhoods and communities.25 This 28-member task force, 
which was led by Sanasarian, included residents and public officials from the City of Milwaukee, 
Milwaukee County, and various suburban communities.  
Among those representing the state was State Senator John Norquist. For his part, 
Norquist did not believe the threat of a federal payback was real. He pointed to other Milwaukee 
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freeway segments that had been truncated without penalty, as well as a freeway in San Francisco 
that had been torn down amidst a similar payback threat—a threat that was never acted upon. 
“Past performance of the Federal government indicates that coercion is only applied successfully 
to those who meekly accept it,” Norquist wrote to Sanasarian. “The payback issue should have 
legitimacy in the debate over the Hoan Bridge options.”26 
Ultimately, the Hoan Bridge Task Force did just what Lake Arterial supporters hoped it 
would. In a “nearly unanimous” final vote in 1986, the Hoan Bridge Task Force recommended a 
four-lane arterial from the southern tip of the Hoan Bridge to Layton Avenue—largely 
reinstating plans that had been killed the previous year.27 It is not clear what affect the threat of a 
federal payment had on the task force, although one county supervisor, who was similar to 
Norquist in his view of urban highways, likened the payback threat to a gun held to the task 
force’s head.28 According to the task force’s final report, Lake Arterial promised to remove 
“excess traffic” from the Bay View neighborhood, thus “permitting the return of a pedestrian-
oriented environment.”29 In an unexpected turn of events, Norquist actually voted in favor of the 
parkway, later explaining that he “went along with the plans for the Lake Arterial in the belief 
that it would take pressure off the Bay View area.”30 
Lake Arterial received enthusiastic support from Wisconsin’s new governor, Tommy 
Thompson, who immediately introduced it to the state’s Transportation Projects Commission in 
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a special meeting of the commission.31 A decision by this commission, which the governor 
chaired, was needed to reverse the legislature’s 1985 attempt to thwart the highway. “This thing 
has been mapped and de-mapped and now we’re mapping it again,” Thompson said.32 The 
project was later forwarded to the state legislature’s Joint Finance Committee and ultimately 
approved by the full legislature as part of a larger transportation bill.33 
Building the parkway proved to be a lengthy and expensive project. An early timeline 
called for construction to start in 1990 and the parkway to open in 1994.34 But construction was 
delayed until 1992, and the roadway did not open until September 1999.35 By then, Lake 
Parkway’s cost had ballooned in size, estimated to be $147 million, or double the cost of the 
Hoan Bridge Task Force’s original estimate even when adjusted for inflation.36 The four-lane, 
limited-access highway featured wide lanes, noise barriers, and grade separation at most 
intersections, prompting some to quip that state highway planners had actually just built a 
freeway in disguise.37 
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The building of Lake Parkway had two major impacts. First, it resulted in an immediate 
increase in the number of vehicles that passed over the Hoan Bridge every day. Between 1999 
and 2000 the bridge experienced a 41 percent increase in traffic. A decade later, the number of 
vehicles traveling over the bridge was up by 87 percent from 1999 levels, although the facility 
was still only at about half capacity.38 The second more significant impact was economic in 
nature. Long before it even opened, community leaders in Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs 
were vigorously marketing their communities to prospective businesses and developers, with the 
new highway as a key feature.39 As the suburb of Cudahy noted in its 1999 downtown master 
plan, its downtown would “now be only ten minutes ... from Downtown Milwaukee along a new, 
easy to drive transportation corridor.”40 By the early 2000s, several suburbs near the parkway 
had secured new businesses and residential developments, citing Lake Parkway as the decisive 
factor.41 
By the end of the 1990s, I-794’s Hoan Bridge was no longer a “bridge to nowhere.” 
Persistent efforts by county and state officials paid off, and in the 1990s the freeway’s reach was 
extended into Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs, not by Lake Freeway as once planned, but by a 
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3.5-mile Lake Parkway.42 This new roadway not only increased usage of the freeway’s Hoan 
Bridge, it also piqued the interest of businesses and developers. But while many suburban 
politicians and business interests rejoiced in their new highway, some civic leaders in Milwaukee 
were hatching plans of their own.
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Chapter 3 
The First Teardown Efforts, 1989-2011 
 
 
 This chapter examines attempts to tear down the Park East Freeway and a significant part 
of I-794 under Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist, who entered office in1988. As we will see in 
this chapter, the Park East teardown idea met most of the “necessary conditions” outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis, but I-794 did not. The Park East removal option had a good window 
of opportunity, strong business support, and strong political leadership from Mayor John 
Norquist and others in his administration. Critically, Norquist was able to address the biggest 
concern of project stakeholders—traffic congestion. The situation for I-794 was notably 
different. The idea benefited from the leadership of the Norquist administration, but this alone 
was not enough to overcome other complications. For one, the window of opportunity for tearing 
down the east-west section of I-794 was complicated by the opening of Lake Parkway. Business 
support was also mixed, with businesses in Milwaukee generally in favor of removal while those 
in the suburbs were opposed. Even more importantly, Norquist never succeeded in dispelling the 
fears of teardown opponents. The east-west section of the freeway carried significantly more 
traffic than the busiest section of Park East and some claimed unacceptable levels of traffic 
congestion or even gridlock would result if the freeway were replaced with a boulevard. In 
addition to this, eliminating this section of freeway, many feared, would undercut the value that 
Lake Parkway had created in the suburbs. 
 
Norquist began his campaign to tear down Park East almost immediately after assuming 
office in 1988. At the time, the Milwaukee Brewers were looking to replacing their aging 1950s 
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facility, County Stadium. As the team considered possible site locations, Norquist made a quiet 
bid for a downtown spot east of the Milwaukee River on land then occupied by the Park East 
spur.1 But the Brewers lacked interest in the downtown site, citing accessibility and parking 
concerns, and instead favored a spot very near its existing ballpark.2 Talk of a downtown stadium 
lingered on into the mid-1990s, with revival attempts made by a state senator and, later, by a 
group of downtown restaurant and tavern owners.3 But the Brewers were unswayed and in 1996 
broke ground on the present-day Miller Park, built in the parking lot of their old facility. 
Early critics of the Park East stadium plan—at least as they pertained to the freeway—
cited traffic congestion and access to downtown as major concerns. “The area is congested 
enough already,” the editorial staff of the Milwaukee Sentinel argued in 1990, “imagine the 
human and vehicular gridlock that would occur each time the Brewers played at home.”4 An 
alderman who represented downtown also balked at the idea and argued that tearing out the 
freeway would also be a mistake. “If you take down a portion of the freeway, you would be 
denying quality access to a portion of the city,” he said.5 And as one 1994 news report put it: 
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“While Park East doesn’t serve its intended function, it plays a valuable role in moving cars and 
trucks through the city’s heart, transportation planners say. It provides convenient access to 
downtown and the lower east side.”6 To top it all off, the article continued, “vehicles that now 
use the Park East would be forced onto city streets not built to handle as much volume as the 
freeway.”7 
In the early 1990s, the Norquist administration quietly initiated talks with state 
transportation officials about the possibility of tearing down the east-west section of I-794.8 The 
exact outcome of these talks are not known, but in a brief—and little-known—1992 study, the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation projected what might happen if this section of freeway 
was replaced with an eight-lane “divided urban boulevard.”9 WisDOT asserted that such a 
roadway “would have a very poor level of service, considerable congestion, and stop and go 
traffic conditions during peak periods” and would cost an estimated at $70 million to $100 
million. The study was also confident that the state would have to repay the federal government 
for its share in the east-west part of the freeway and possibly do the same for the north-south 
section. 
As far as the public was concerned, tearing down any part of I-794 did not become a 
matter of debate until 1995. In the spring of that year, Peter Park, then an adjunct professor at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, led an urban design studio class in which he asked students 
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to envision what could be done with the freeway after it had reached the end of its structural 
lifespan.10 As Park later explained, he felt Milwaukee would be better served if I-794 were 
replaced with “a beautiful and memorable street modeled after the grand boulevards that have 
worked for almost 100 years in Milwaukee and other great cities like Boston, New York, Paris, 
and Edinburgh.”11 Park’s students recommended that nearly all of I-794 be torn down, the Hoan 
Bridge included, and that it be replaced with an at-grade boulevard.12 The class later pitched this 
idea to local public officials, including Mayor Norquist, who, in the words of one reporter, 
“urged the class not to be daunted by objections from the state Department of Transportation.”13 
In 1995, Norquist appointed Park his planning director.14 
The vision Park and his students proposed provoked a predictable response from 
WisDOT. In an op-ed piece in the Milwaukee Sentinel, Robert Packee, district director for the 
state transportation department, said the idea was unfeasible due to the heavy traffic the highway 
carried through downtown. Packee, who had expressed earlier opposition to the Park East 
stadium idea, said a replacement boulevard would have to be ten lanes wide, and even still such a 
road would result in “more traffic jams, more business disruptions, more accidents, and more air 
pollution” than the freeway it replaced.15 Growing congestion and gridlock, he asserted, would 
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also threaten the economic development of the city.16 Packee argued that rebuilding the freeway 
in an aesthetically-pleasing manner, complete with decorative lighting and green space, would be 
better than tearing it down. “That,” he said, “would make it a much more attractive asset to the 
community—and an efficient transportation facility.”17 
That same year, however, the Park East teardown idea gained new momentum. In 
September 1995, federal transportation department officials informed Norquist they were open to 
his plan but that he needed the support of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, as well 
as to consult with SEWRPC and Milwaukee County.18 That October, Norquist proclaimed that 
the freeway would “very likely” come down “within the next year or so.”19 What had once been 
a relatively quiet campaign was now an open promise. “It doesn’t serve any purpose,” he said. 
“It divides downtown. It interrupts the Riverwalk. I don’t know anyone who likes it very 
much.”20 In its place, he envisioned a revitalized corridor of mixed-use commercial and 
residential buildings. “It could really be a handsome street.”21 By the end of the month, WisDOT 
officials had indicated a willingness to discuss Norquist’s ideas but said they wanted to see a 
specific proposal that would address traffic concerns, as well as who would cover the cost of 
demolition.22 They did, however, reaffirm their opposition to any such plans for I-794.23 
Razing Park East gradually garnered some serious support from downtown business 
interests. “The Park East Freeway is a monument to bad city planning,” said Gary Grunau, a 
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major Milwaukee real estate developer and chairman of the downtown Riverwalk business 
improvement district. “It makes all the sense in the world to tear it down.”24 This sentiment was 
echoed by Mark Brickman, president and CEO of a major Milwaukee commercial real estate 
brokerage. “Right now,” Brickman said, “downtown is bifurcated by this freeway. Tearing it 
down would reunite the downtown.” In March 1997, Grunau said mustering support for the 
teardown would be one of the district’s “top priorities” of the year.25 The editorial staff of the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel newspaper also expressed interest in the teardown, characterizing 
the freeway stub as being “little more than a long exit ramp—a mere shadow of what it could 
have been.”26 
Not everyone shared these sentiments, however. Some business owners viewed the 
freeway as vital to their business or to downtown as a whole. Robert Gold, owner of a grocery 
store built at the terminus of the freeway spur in land that had at one time been cleared for the 
never-built portion of the freeway, noted in 1997 that he had “a nice on/off ramp for our 
customers and for people in downtown.”27 The most vocal critic of the teardown idea, however, 
was George Watts, owner of a high-end downtown kitchenware store and restaurant. “The Park 
East freeway is absolutely vital to downtown,” he said, adding that thought Norquist’s efforts 
were an attempt to “build a Potemkin village held together by government funds.”28 
Efforts to tear down both Park East and I-794 became part of the City of Milwaukee’s 
planning process for a downtown master plan. Part of this process involved a multi-day 
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workshop series, held in March of 1998, during which business leaders and members of the 
general public were asked to identify “the location of the freeway and interstate system in the 
year 2040,” as well as to indicate which downtown streets would function as two-way streets, 
one way streets, and which would be boulevards. In total, about 300 people, organized into small 
groups, participated in the workshop series. All of the groups removed Park East, and all but two 
groups converted I-794 to an at-grade boulevard. Of those that kept I-794 in place, one group 
kept the freeway as-is; the other tunneled the highway underground.29 
Norquist’s push to tear down Park East cleared a major hurdle in 1998. That August, 
SEWRPC released a study it had done at the request of the city that examined how removing a 
major portion of the freeway might impact traffic.30 This study found that traffic congestion on 
downtown arterial streets would likely “remain relatively modest” and that any resulting 
congestion would mostly be concentrated at intersections leading up to the small remaining stub 
of the freeway.31 Many motorists that had once used the corridor, the study said, would take 
other routes (most notably I-794), thereby reducing the overall usage of the Park East corridor 
from 51,700 vehicles per weekday to about 30,600 vehicles per weekday.32 With traffic 
congestion fears now largely alleviated, the project became an easier sell. In fact, Milwaukee 
County Executive Tom Ament later cited the study as a key reason he supported the project. “In 
concept, I support the removal of the Park East Freeway because I believe that this can be 
accomplished without creating congestion in the Downtown area,” he said.33 
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 But just as the Park East teardown was gaining serious momentum, similar plans for I-
794 hit major roadblocks. In August 1998, Mariano Schifalacqua, the city’s engineer, announced 
that the city was studying the feasibility of tearing down the east-west portion of the freeway, 
from Sixth Street to the lakefront.34 Doing so, Schifalacqua said, would simplify the upcoming 
reconstruction of the state’s Marquette Interchange, potentially saving the state $200 million in 
construction costs for a project then estimated to cost $460 million.35 Schifalacqua’s 
announcement marked the first time anyone had publically acknowledged that city officials were 
exploring the demolition of I-794. 
This announcement was met by a strong—and perhaps predictable—response from 
public officials representing Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs. “We see a ‘connected’ Lake 
Parkway as vital to our economic well-being as we approach the millennium,” said St. Francis 
City Administrator Ralph Voltner. Tearing down part of I-794, he said, would “jeopardize” the 
millions spent on the Lake Parkway extension.36 It was a sentiment echoed by many others. A 
resolution introduced by five county supervisors said I-794 would greatly impair the flow of 
traffic and “do serious harm to the economic vitality” of Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs “at a 
time when they are poised to realize the benefit of an enhanced transportation link through the 
Lake Parkway.”37 The city council of St. Francis argued that tearing down I-794, “would result 
in the Lake Parkway being a complete waste of money, time, land, and convenience to the 
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public.”38 Within months, the idea to tear down part of I-794 had garnered positions of 
opposition from five county supervisors, four suburbs, two state assembly representatives, the 
editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel newspaper, and Milwaukee County Executive 
Tom Ament.39  
Not everyone was opposed to the idea, however. Replacing I-794 with a boulevard found 
favor among many residents and business owners in Milwaukee’s Third Ward, a neighborhood 
partially encircled—and some would say cut off—by the freeway. The Historic Third Ward 
Association, the neighborhood’s business improvement district organization, publically endorsed 
studying the idea further. Einar Tangen, the organization’s president, explained that, “from the 
Third Ward’s perspective, reuniting the city’s fastest area of increasing land values with the 
downtown and augmenting the opportunities to live and work in the city are good things for us 
and the city as a whole. … The only relevant issue is how accessibility to the Ward and the rest 
of downtown is maintained.”40  
In early 1999, Harley-Davidson, the popular American motorcycle manufacturer, 
announced it was interested in opening a museum at the former Schlitz brewery site, which was 
then separated from downtown by Park East. But the company’s commitment to the area was 
contingent on Park East being torn down. From the company’s perspective, was a visual and 
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physical barrier between the brewery site and downtown.41 It was Harley’s interest that 
convinced Governor Tommy Thompson to support Norquist’s plan for Park East. As Gary 
Grunau explained years later: 
 
When I made the deal … [Harley-Davidson Chief Executive Officer] Jeff Bluestein … to 
buy the building [in Schlitz Park], he said, “We gotta get that freeway down.” So Jeff and 
I and Scott Sampson on a Friday morning in January drove out to Madison and met with 
Tommy Thompson. … And in [a] one hour meeting that morning when Tommy realized 
the effect of what Harley could have … he said, ‘We’ll get that down.’ So Tommy called 
Norquist and Ament and within two weeks they agreed to take it down.42 
 
 
 
Both the Park East and I-794 teardowns were intertwined in broader negotiations on how 
to spend $241 million in federal money in danger of being lost unless the state, county, and city 
could agree how to spend it. As a Journal Sentinel story explained: “The mayor wanted to use 
some of the money to get rid of the Park East. The governor wanted to spend some of the money 
on rebuilding the Marquette Interchange, a plan that could go forward without deciding I-794’s 
fate. They compromised to reach a deal.”43  
When Milwaukee’s downtown master plan was released in early 1999, it identified 
tearing down Park East44 as a major catalytic project, supported by the Harley Davidson museum 
and a six-story “mixed use entertainment complex” as “activity generators.”45 Tearing out the 
freeway would have other benefits besides economic development, however, especially when it 
came to reconnecting the urban street greet. As the plan noted,  
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Elevated highways do not physically preclude pedestrian travel beneath them. There are 
some sidewalks beneath them, and large areas under these highways are used for parking. 
However, these highways do present significant psychological barriers to pedestrian 
travel: they loom over the street blocking the sun and are, altogether, out of scale for 
pedestrians. … Few pedestrians intentionally walk through these areas. This pedestrian 
“disconnection” diminishes the value and vibrancy of the severed neighborhoods, 
especially to the northwest.46 
 
 
The plan further noted that, 
 
 
The greatest impediment to the Gateway Neighborhoods’ tapping the Downtown market 
is real or perceived barriers between them and Downtown. For example, in interviews 
with Downtown and neighborhood representatives and in the public workshops and 
briefings on the draft Downtown Plan, it was often mentioned that the Park East Freeway 
was seen as a barrier that separated the Historic King Drive and Brewers Hill 
neighborhoods from Downtown. Removing that barrier is seen as a way to encourage 
more visitors, business investment, and potential residents to come to the 
neighborhoods.47 
  
 
Although the downtown plan it did not preclude the possibility that I-794 might be torn 
down some day—and indeed even mentioned it as a possibility—the plan did not identify the 
teardown as a catalytic project. Perhaps still feeling the political sting that his I-794 proposal had 
provoked, Norquist told one reporter: “You don’t want to poke a stick into every beehive that 
comes along.”48 Indeed, he never pushed the issue again, not even in December when a 
combination of factors, including outdated bracing methods and extreme cold lead to the partial 
failure of the Hoan Bridge, shut down much of the freeway for the better part of a year and 
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arguably provided an ideal window of opportunity to re-evaluate I-794.49 But by then even 
Norquist joined the chorus of public officials calling for the bridge’s immediate repair, offering 
Governor Thompson the “city’s full cooperation” expediting the bridge’s rehabilitation.50 
 The Park East teardown had the endorsement of the governor, the county executive, and 
key business interests, but that did not stop a last-ditch effort to block the plan by its most 
outspoken critic. In July 2000, George Watts—who had run against Norquist in the mayoral 
election that April—called for Norquist’s resignation over the Park East issue and threatened a 
recall election if he did not.51 “This will be absolutely devastating, economically, to downtown,” 
Watts forecasted. “It’s our welcome mat to the world, and (Norquist) wants to pull it out.”52 In a 
vehement op-ed piece published in the Journal Sentinel, Watts denounced Norquist’s plan as 
“crass stupidity” that would cause a litany of ills, including increased traffic congestion, noise, 
and pollution.53 It would also cost downtown jobs, he said, and increase traffic deaths and delay 
emergency vehicles. He named more than a dozen businesses and organizations that would be 
hurt by the demolition project. In short, Watts argued, taking down Park East would be nothing 
short of “city suicide.”54 In the ensuing months, he launched a “Save our Spur” campaign that 
included signature-gathering and calling on state and federal officials to halt the project.55 He 
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also filed a lawsuit in federal court, contending the project’s environmental impact assessment 
was faulty.56 
Public opinion over the matter is difficult to evaluate but appears to have favored the 
teardown. In July 2000, Watts’ campaign conducted a telephone poll of 300 Milwaukee residents 
and, according to one newspaper story, found that, “45% of likely Milwaukee voters were 
against knocking down the freeway spur, with 25% in favor and the rest undecided or declining 
to state an opinion.” However, at a public information hearing earlier that month, 21 written 
comments had been left in favor of removal and only 11 opposed the project.57 A public hearing 
in December 2000 followed suit: 68 percent of the 199 statements given were said to favor 
removing the freeway, with only 32 percent opposed.58 At that same meeting, Grunau claimed he 
had spoken with all the organizations Watts had named in his earlier editorial, stating that 10 of 
those supported the demolition project and four of them did not think it would affect them one 
way or the other.59 
Despite Watts’ efforts, Park East fell relatively swiftly. In late 2000, SEWRPC 
announced that traffic congestion in the area would be even lower than previously forecasted if a 
new bridge was built over the Milwaukee River.60 By late 2001, the demolition proposal had 
won all necessary endorsements from federal, state, and local agencies and committees.61 The 
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freeway’s demolition was initially delayed by Watts’ lawsuit and environmental contamination 
found in Park East’s soil.62 However, in March 2002 a U.S. district judge threw out Watts’ 
lawsuit. Watts called the outcome “a heartbreak for Milwaukee’s future.” “When people see 
what’s going to happen,” he said, “I think they’re going to be outraged.”63 In June 2002, with the 
environmental contamination cleaned up, the ramps feeding Park East were closed and 
demolition began.64 
 And so Park East was torn down but I-794 was spared the wrecking ball. As we saw in 
this chapter, the Park East teardown idea met most of the “necessary conditions” outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis, but I-794 did not. The Park East teardown idea benefited from a good 
window of opportunity, strong business support, and strong political leadership. It also promised 
to “do no harm,” by showing that virtually no traffic congestion would result from the freeway’s 
absence. The situation for I-794 was very different. Although it too had the support of the 
Norquist administration, this alone was not enough to overcome other complications, such as the 
opening of Lake Parkway. A notable difference between the two teardown proposals is that 
Norquist never succeeded in dispelling the fears of teardown opponents. The east-west section of 
the freeway carried significantly more traffic than the busiest section of Park East and many 
feared unacceptable levels of traffic congestion would result from the freeway’s absence. Not 
only this, many also feared demolishing this section of freeway would undercut the value that 
Lake Parkway for Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs. This was, however, not the last time I-794 
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would be considered for demolition. As the first decade of the 2000s drew to a close, I-794 
approached a critical juncture. To keep the freeway safe and operational, the state transportation 
department would have to invest hundreds of millions of dollars into the reconstruction of the 
roadway. Faced with the high projected cost of this work, even WisDOT officials began to 
wonder whether the demolition option might make sense after all.
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Chapter 4 
The Second I-794 Teardown Proposal, 2008-2011 
 
 This chapter examines the second and final proposal to tear down the Hoan Bridge 
(north-south) portion of I-794, which took place from 2008 to 2011. As we will see in this 
chapter, this proposal met very few of the “necessary conditions” outlined in the introduction of 
this study. Although the teardown proposal had a good window of opportunity, it lacked any real 
form of policy entrepreneurship and only garnered business support within the City of 
Milwaukee. This proposal also failed to meet the “do no harm” condition. Although traffic 
congestion was not a major concern, as it had been in Norquist’s earlier attempt to tear down the 
east-west section of the freeway, the freeway’s suburban constituency felt a boulevard 
replacement would undercut the economic value the freeway and Lake Parkway had created in 
their communities. Ultimately, a strong coalition of suburban and county leaders rallied to save 
the Hoan Bridge, and the state eventually rehabilitated and rebuilt the freeway instead of tearing 
it down. 
  
  By 2008, much of I-794 was reaching the end of its structural lifespan, with parts of the 
freeway dating to the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 Although many of the piers supporting the 
Hoan Bridge portion of the freeway did not need to be replaced, the freeway’s driving surface 
was in rough shape. As one observer noted, years of spot repairs had turned the freeway’s 
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driving surface into something of resembling “a patchwork quilt.”2 The high projected cost of the 
necessary repair and reconstruction work prompted some state transportation officials to examine 
alternatives, including a study that examined whether the Hoan Bridge was really needed at all.3 
“We’re looking at the feasibility of tearing (the Hoan Bridge) down because the cost of 
rehabilitation is astronomical,” said Frank Busalacchi, the state secretary of transportation.4 
By nearly anyone’s measure, the work required to repair the freeway was projected to be 
very expensive. State transportation officials estimated this work would cost between $200 
million and $240 million.5 The long-term outlook was even more costly. By 2025, another $250 
million to $300 million would be needed to replace the freeway’s Lake Interchange, and a total 
replacement of the bridge would be needed in 2050, estimated to cost a staggering inflation-
adjusted $2 billion to $3 billion.6 
Like the early proposal to tear down the east-west portion of the freeway, reaction among 
suburban politicians was both immediate and negative. “Anybody who talks about tearing down 
the Hoan Bridge is out of their mind,” said State Representative Christine Sinicki.7 Milwaukee 
County Supervisor Patricia Jursik, who represented St. Francis, Cudahy, South Milwaukee, and 
part of Oak Creek, organized a “coalition” of elected officials who opposed any further 
replacement studies. “Replacing I-794’s Hoan Bridge with ground level lift bridges is not a 
satisfactory alternative,” she said in a press release. “Much of the rapid development in the 
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southern portion of Milwaukee County is due to vital transportation links like the Hoan Bridge.”8 
Sinicki, along with two other county supervisors, as well as the mayors of St. Francis, South 
Milwaukee, and Cudahy, sent a letter to Busalacchi requesting that the state plan for the upkeep 
of the Hoan Bridge and notify her group of any further planning.9  
Later that month, a former Journal Sentinel reporter leaked the details of a draft 
feasibility study done by the consulting firm HNTB at the request of WisDOT.10 The freeway, 
HNTB concluded, was “oversized for its current and projected traffic capacity,” and said there 
was the possibility “to create a roadway that meets appropriate capacity” while simultaneously 
freeing up land for other uses.11 HNTB recommended replacing the bridge with a ground-level 
boulevard and lift bridge and provided two redevelopment scenarios: one maximizing public 
space and another maximizing the area’s private development potential. The first scenario was 
projected to bring 5,000 residential units valued at just under $2.2 billion. The second scenario 
was projected to bring 9,900 housing units valued at $5.7 billion. This development was 
projected to result in 1,361 to 8,090 jobs and $3.1 million to $18.2 million yearly tax revenue, 
respectively.12 Land sales alone were estimated to bring $90 million to $204 million.13 
Then there was the savings to be gained from the more conservative roadway itself. 
HNTB projected that the boulevard option would cost more in the short term, but interchange 
reconstruction in 2025 would actually make it the cheaper option by $80 million. However, the 
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boulevard would require more regular maintenance, and the costs savings difference between the 
two options would narrow over the next three decades—that is, until it was time to completely 
rebuild the Hoan Bridge, an extremely expensive undertaking.14 The time cost to suburban 
commuters who used the bridge was projected to be relatively modest. A traffic study done about 
this same time projected that the boulevard option would result in a delay of about two to three 
minutes for any given motorist. In addition, the opening of the proposed lift bridge would stall 
traffic for six minutes once a day.15 
News of the HNTB study ignited something of a political firestorm. “We were told there 
was no plan, then this shows up,” said State Representative Christine Sinicki.16 “I’m thoroughly 
disgusted with the way this all developed,” said Tom Zepecki, the mayor of South Milwaukee.17 
Several politicians even donned t-shirts inscribed with “SOB,” which may have had a double 
meaning, but officially stood for “Save Our Bridge.”18 “Before the mighty arch of the Hoan 
Bridge, south siders were often treated as the poor step-sister of the larger community,” said 
Jursik in a press release, “The recent renaissance within Bay View and the greater south shore 
coincides precisely with the building of the Hoan Bridge in 1977. We must not permit the DOT 
to steal our glass slipper, the Hoan Bridge.”19 
Other organizations, notably those in the City of Milwaukee, urged state authorities to 
study all available alternatives. The Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce also 
endorsed the idea of further studies, advocating no particular plan but an examination of all 
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options. “The dumbest thing we could do,” said Steve Baas, a spokesperson for the organization, 
“is wait until the Hoan Bridge is in critical shape and have to rush to make a decision or shut it 
down while we wait to make a decision.”20 The Journal Sentinel took no formal stance on the 
teardown issue, except to say that the idea was at least worth studying. “Tearing down the Hoan 
Bridge?” they asked. “Not without a very good reason. But that’s why the study should be done,” 
the Journal Sentinel argued, to “find out if there is a good reason to tear down the bridge.”21 
The debate over the fate of the interstate bridge heated up quickly. In August 2009, a 
group of local and state leaders announced they had formed an organization known as the 
Coalition to Save the Hoan.22 This group, which was spearheaded by Jursik, argued that the 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Association of Commerce’s request for more information articulated a 
“hidden assumption” that the bridge should be torn down. They also balked at WisDOT’s cost 
estimate for rehabilitation work, then estimated at around $200 million.23 For a time, the MMAC 
seemed to be pitted against Jursik and her coalition. The MMAC continued its plea for further 
studies of all possible options, asking that the future of the I-794 corridor would be “driven by 
facts, not fear.”24 Jursik, however, continued to insist that there was nothing worth studying, that 
I-794 and the Hoan Bridge fulfilled all the needs.25 She also charged MMAC with conspiring 
with WisDOT and HNTB to secure the bridge’s demise. “For the MMAC to suggest that we 
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should just get the facts now is really a smokescreen for advancing the HNTB study in my 
opinion,” Jursik said in a letter to the MMAC’s president.26 
Over the next several months, Jursik and other members of the Hoan coalition worked 
diligently to pressure state officials to drop any study of alternatives and instead simply rebuild 
the bridge. They held informational meetings and luncheons, gathered signatures, and passed a 
county board resolution requesting that WisDOT study repairing the Hoan Bridge before 
considering other alternatives.27 In November 2009, Jursik and other members of the Hoan 
coalition presented Governor Jim Doyle with the signatures of more than 8,000 constituents 
opposed to tearing down the Hoan.28 
In the City of Milwaukee, political support for the boulevard option was weak at best. 
The city engineer and public works commissioner requested that the state prepare an alternatives 
analysis, but Mayor Tom Barrett was publically quiet on the issue.29 Barrett’s silence may have 
been partly due to what happened (or did not happen in the Park East corridor). Although some 
of the land in the freeway’s footprint has been redeveloped, the majority of it remains empty—an 
outcome observers have blamed on mismanagement by county officials, the economic recession, 
turnover at the Department of City Development, and excessive bureaucracy.30 But whatever the 
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cause, vacant land in Park East likely made a teardown of I-794 a politically tougher sell. One 
Milwaukee alderperson introduced a resolution outlining a list of requirements for WisDOT, 
including a demand that any replacement roadway “remain elevated over all land uses currently 
beneath” the Hoan, including a regional sewer treatment plant, a summer music festival park, 
and the city’s port.31 In essence, the alderman was requesting a lower version of what was 
already in place. Additionally, three Milwaukee alderpersons were actually members of the Hoan 
coalition.32 
As the debate over the future of the bridge lingered on, the bridge itself continued to 
crumble. By the summer of 2010, WisDOT hired a contractor to install netting around parts of 
the freeway to catch falling concrete.33 This was a standard safety practice, but one that instilled 
little confidence in the freeway’s structural integrity. At about this same time, Governor Doyle 
commissioned an engineering inspection of the bridge and repair work to keep the bridge 
structurally sound until a longer-term solution was decided.34 
The fate of the Hoan Bridge—and the rest of I-794—was definitively decided in early 
2011. At that time, Wisconsin’s newly-elected governor, Scott Walker, announced that the state 
would re-deck and re-paint the bridge, perform concrete overlays and surface repairs of the 
freeway’s Lake Interchange, and fully replace the east-west section of I-794 between the 
Marquette and Lake Interchanges beginning in about 2013—all at an estimated cost of $300 
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million.35 Walker’s decision to repair the freeway was hardly surprising. In the late 1990s, when 
serving as a state representative for Wauwatosa, Walker had been among those who expressed 
opposition to tearing down the east-west portion of the freeway.36 More recently, while 
campaigning for governor, Walker had used the Hoan Bridge as a backdrop—quite literally—to 
illustrate why federal money earmarked for a light rail project should instead be used to repair 
the state’s deteriorating roads.37 More directly, the freeway also served the interests of the 
governor’s suburban constituency. “The Hoan isn’t just any bridge,” Walker said in a press 
release announcing the overhaul, “it’s a landmark of Milwaukee and a vital connection for Bay 
View, St. Francis, Cudahy, South Milwaukee and Oak Creek residents to downtown 
Milwaukee.”38 
And so, by 2011, a second proposal to tear down part of I-794 came and went. As we saw 
in this chapter, this second proposal met few of the “necessary conditions” outlined in the 
introduction of this study. Although this teardown proposal had a better window of opportunity 
than Norquist’s earlier attempt, it lacked any real form of policy entrepreneurship and only 
garnered business support within the City of Milwaukee. Like Norquist’s campaign a decade 
earlier, WisDOT’s proposal also failed to meet the “do no harm” condition; although traffic 
congestion was not a major concern, the freeway’s suburban constituency felt a boulevard 
replacement would undercut the economic value realized through the Lake Parkway extension. 
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Conclusion 
  
What can the cases of Park East and I-794 tell us about the attributes of a successful 
freeway teardown? Here we start by examining how Park East compared in the evaluation 
categories identified in the introduction. Next, we consider the Norquist’s proposal to tear down 
the east-west section of I-794 in the 1990s. Finally, we turn our attention to the final I-794 tear 
down proposal for the Hoan Bridge. A summary table of findings is presented at the end of this 
section. The cases of Park East and I-794 support the idea that freeway removal efforts may 
need: (1) An adequate window of opportunity; (2) a strong advocate for the teardown option; (3) 
business support, and; (4) reasonable assurances from teardown proponents that the removal 
option will “do no harm.” 
 
Park East Teardown 
1989-2002 
 
The Park East Freeway spur was first targeted for demolition by the John Norquist 
administration starting in 1989. Although initially unsuccessful, Norquist continued his 
campaign against the freeway spur for much the 1990s, finally securing its demise in a pivotal 
1999 agreement with the state and county over how to spend $241 million in federal funds. 
Demolition work began in 2002. 
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Integrity and Safety Concerns 
Park East had several years of service life ahead of it when it was torn down in 2002. 
Although it was nearing the end of its structural lifespan, it was by no means there yet. Park East 
was completed in parts between 1968 and 1971. Freeway facilities typically last about 40-50 
years.1 When Norquist began his campaign to tear down Park East, the freeway was only about 
two decades old. In 1999, the year the freeway’s fate was decided, the facility still had at least a 
decade of service life ahead of it, WisDOT having actually resurfaced the freeway just four years 
earlier. It would be fair to say that Park East was aging, but it was not at the end of its design life. 
 
Window of Opportunity 
 The teardown of Park East had two (possibly three) windows of opportunity. The initial 
window of opportunity was the Brewers’ consideration of other stadium options in the late 
19980s and early 1990s. The second window of opportunity was the planning process for the 
Milwaukee’s downtown master plan in the 1990s. This window was further enhanced by the 
availability of federal money to cover a significant portion of the freeway’s demolition. 
 
Business Support 
 The Park East teardown appears to have enjoyed strong support from downtown 
Milwaukee business interests. This was evident as early as 1995, when area restaurant and tavern 
owners still held out hope that a downtown stadium might materialize. Later, the teardown 
option had the support of business interests, including a prominent developer and a downtown 
business improvement district. A key supporter was also Harley Davidson. Business owner 
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George Watts campaigned vigorously against the teardown option, but his views on the freeway 
do not appear to have been widely accepted. 
 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
Policy entrepreneurship was clearly evident in the case of Park East. This role was filled 
by John Norquist, who vigorously promoted the teardown option from the late 1980s through the 
late 1990s. Peter Park and Gary Grunau were also influential in this regard. Without the efforts 
of Norquist and others, it is conceivable, perhaps even very likely, that state transportation 
officials would have rebuilt, rather than demolished, the freeway. 
 
“Do No Harm” Principle 
One of the triumphs of the Park East teardown option is that it made reasonable 
assurances to “do no harm.” In the case Park East, the possibility of traffic congestion after a 
teardown appears to have been the major concern among critics. Although the freeway did not 
serve its intended purpose, some argued, Park East still moved significant volumes of traffic that 
might overwhelm surface streets. Few people seemed to believe that tearing down the half-mile 
freeway spur would undercut the economic vitality of Milwaukee’s downtown (save for the likes 
of George Watts). After all, even with Park East out of the picture, motor vehicle traffic moving 
to and from downtown would continue to be served by other main-line freeways, such as I-94 
and I-43, as well as the regional freeway spur of I-794. A secondary concern, if Tommy 
Thompson’s contingent support of the teardown is any indication, may have been the 
redevelopment potential of the corridor. 
  67 
By 1999, Norquist and other teardown proponents had effectively addressed both of these 
concerns. The issue of traffic congestion had been largely dealt with by SEWRPC’s traffic study, 
done at the request of the city in 1998. With the issue of traffic out of the way, it was much 
easier for stakeholders in the project to see the freeway as an unnecessary or, as Norquist and 
others argued, a barrier to something better. Governor Thompson’s support was secured in 1999 
with assurance from Harley Davidson that they would locate their company museum in a former 
Schlitz brewery complex. 
 
 
First I-794 Teardown Proposal 
East-West Segment 
c.1992-1999 
 
The east-west segment of I-794 was targeted for demolition by the John Norquist 
administration starting in the early 1990s. Norquist’s proposal to replace this part of the freeway 
with a boulevard sparked far more controversy and eventually died in the 1999 agreement 
between the state, county, and city over how to spend $241 million in federal funds. 
 
Integrity and Safety Concerns 
 Like Park East, integrity and safety concerns were not especially evident in the proposal 
to tear out the east-west segment of I-794. The freeway was certainly aging but in no danger of 
collapsing and would not need to be rebuilt until the 2010s. 
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Window of Opportunity 
 The window of opportunity in the case of I-794 was multifaceted and complicated. By 
the late 1990s, the state was planning for the reconstruction of Milwaukee’s massive Marquette 
Interchange, which had opened in 1968. The design of this interchange depended on the 
freeways that fed it. A ground-level boulevard might have resulted in a less expensive 
interchange design, potentially saving the state millions while simultaneously opening up land 
near downtown for other uses.  
But Norquist’s teardown efforts came at the exact moment that a major investment in the 
corridor was well underway. When Norquist first floated the idea of tearing down the east-west 
section of I -794, state transportation officials had already broken ground on the Lake Parkway, 
which had been nearly a decade and a half in the making. Up to that point, virtually all planning 
efforts for the I-794 corridor at the county and state level had emphasized enhancing—rather 
than diminishing—the significance of the freeway. At no point in the planning process is there 
evidence than anyone had ever questioned the existence of the freeway. Norquist’s proposal to 
demolish a major section of I-794 was not merely inconsistent with years of planning; it called 
into the question the most basic assumption on which all those years of planning had been 
built—and at precisely the moment those efforts were to pay economic dividends to 
Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs. 
 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
 John Norquist and Peter Park served as policy entrepreneurs for the tearing down of the 
east-west segment of I-794. More effort seems to have been put into Park East, however, perhaps 
because it was viewed as the more politically feasible. 
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Business Support 
 The teardown of the east-west section of I-794 appears to have had strong support from 
business owners in the Third Ward neighborhood, who viewed the freeway as a barrier between 
their neighborhood and downtown. Suburban business owners were generally opposed to the 
idea. The situation was perhaps best summarized by a 1998 news headline: “Feelings on 
Freeway Follow Geography.”2 
 
“Do No Harm” Principle 
Although a partial teardown of I-794 could have brought significant benefits to the City 
of Milwaukee, it also stood to result in a great deal of harm—at least according to the state 
transportation department and various suburban officials. Like Park East, traffic congestion was 
a major concern for I-794. The busiest section of the east-west segment of freeway carried 
almost double the traffic that Park East did. State transportation planners forecasted that any 
replacement boulevard for this part of the freeway would provide a mediocre level of service to 
motorists at best and “gridlock” at its worst. Another major concern was a teardown’s economic 
impact. Milwaukee’s southeastern suburbs seem to have benefited significantly from an 
extension of the freeway, and they feared demolition would jeopardize the value Lake Parkway 
(in conjunction with I-794) had created. 
Tearing down I-794 would also have undercut years of work by state and county officials 
to optimize the corridor for people driving cars. If the east-west leg of the freeway had been 
eliminated at about the same time as Park East was demolished, some of the traffic Lake 
Parkway had been built for might never have materialized or reverted to old routes leaving 
                                                
2. James Burnett III, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, October 7, 1998, http://bit.ly/1OgAvDv.  
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Milwaukee County again with a “bridge to nowhere”—perhaps this time accompanied by a 
newly-minted parkway to nowhere. 
In a final twist of irony, tearing down I-794 also threatened the Park East teardown. 
When SEWRPC developed its traffic forecasts for the Park East teardown, it did so with the 
assumption that I-794 would remain in place and some of the “spillover” traffic after Park East 
was no more. A proposal to tear down I-794 would require a reassessment of the traffic studies 
that supported the Park East removal, potentially jeopardizing that project. 
Was the I-794 teardown even feasible? There is some evidence that WisDOT’s 1992 
forecast of “gridlock” warranted skepticism.  Why so? First, state transportation department had 
a self-interest in keeping the corridor in place as-is given all the planning that had gone into Lake 
Parkway. Indeed, WisDOT officials like Robert Packee, noted earlier for his editorial rebuttal to 
Peter Park’s teardown suggestion, had spent significant amounts of time working on the Lake 
Parkway plan.3 
Moreover, experience elsewhere suggests that high traffic volumes do not automatically 
make freeway teardowns unfeasible. A notable high-profile example of this occurred in 
September 1996, when the California transportation department closed down of San Francisco’s 
Central Freeway to demolish the highway’s upper deck, which had been damaged in the 1989 
Loma Prieta Earthquake. Prior to the closure, commuters were warned to brace for what was 
almost certain to be nightmarish traffic congestion, possibly even gridlock. At the time, the 
freeway moved about 80,000 vehicles per day.4 But a traffic Armageddon never materialized; the 
                                                
3. For references to Packee’s involvement in the project, see: HNTB Corporation, The Lake Parkway: 
Evolution of a Roadway, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, May 2001, 29, 33, 81 
4. “Commuters Brace for Nightmarish Traffic Jams,” Lodi News-Sentinel, August 23, 1996, 
http://bit.ly/1KRsiYc. 
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flow of traffic actually seemed to improve with the freeway closed.5 The city’s mayor suggested 
that perhaps the freeway was not needed after all.6 As noted earlier, this segment of freeway was 
eventually demolished. The parallels between I-794 and Central Freeway are intriguing. In 1998, 
just prior to the opening of Lake Parkway, the busiest section of I-794 moved an average of 
79,730 vehicles per day, with a weekday-only average of 88,830. 
More recently, WisDOT’s own rebuilding of the east-west section of I-794 in the 2010s 
also suggest a lower-capacity roadway was possible. During this time, the east-west section of 
the freeway was completely rebuilt from the ground up. This was accomplished in two phases: 
First the eastbound lanes of were closed, demolished, and rebuilt. During this phase, traffic 
traveling easterly and westerly operated on the westbound shared the same side of the freeway. 
Once that side reopened, the same was done to the westbound lanes.7 Even with only half of the 
freeway usable at any given time, downtown Milwaukee was never overwhelmed with 
unmanageable traffic or the dreaded “gridlock.” 
All of this is not to say the Norquist’s proposal might not have result in some traffic 
problems or delay. Nor is it meant trivialize the engineering considerations of such a massive 
project. But it does suggest that Norquist’s proposal was not unfeasible outright, and that it might 
have benefited from a closer look from an objective third party. 
 
 
 
                                                
5. “S.F., Commute a Breeze,” Lodi News-Sentinel, August 27, 1996, http://bit.ly/1Q9KjQz; “S.F 
Commuters Find Clear Streets,” Lodi News-Sentinel, September 4, 1996, http://bit.ly/1QMbuEz.  
6. “Mayor Floats Idea of Razing Freeway,” Lodi News-Sentinel, September 7, 1996, http://bit.ly/1TcUmbI. 
7. Lydia Mulvany, “Changes Coming to I-794 Hoan Bridge as Construction Work to Start,” Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, jsonline.com, http://bit.ly/1SlXMrQ; “I-794 Lake Freeway/Hoan Bridge Get Around Guide – Late 
2014 Thru Late 2015,” projects.511wi.gov, http://bit.ly/1oxp4yT.  
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Second I-794 Teardown Proposal 
Hoan Bridge Segment 
2008-2011 
 
In 2008, WisDOT examined the feasibility of replacing the Hoan Bridge segment of I-
794 with an at-grade roadway and lift bridge. Like the earlier proposal to tear down the east-west 
segment of the freeway, this proposal sparked a political firestorm from Milwaukee’s 
southeastern suburbs, which the freeway predominately served. The Hoan Bridge was later re-
decked, rather than removed. 
 
Integrity and Safety Concerns 
I-794’s integrity and safety was of some concern by 2008. The Hoan Bridge was built in 
the first half of the 1970s and opened to motor vehicle traffic in 1977. It was in no apparent 
danger of collapsing, but at nearly four decades old, it would soon require significant restoration 
and reconstruction work. Some parts of the Hoan Bridge were shedding chunks of concrete, 
prompting the state transportation department to install netting to catch this potentially lethal 
debris. 
 
Window of Opportunity 
 The window of opportunity for I-794 was the freeway’s deteriorating condition, the high 
cost of necessary reconstruction work, and the HNTB traffic and economic development study 
which recommended a boulevard replacement for the freeway. 
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Business Support 
 A teardown of the Hoan Bridge appears to have piqued the interest of the Historic Third 
Ward Association and the Milwaukee Metropolitan Area Chamber of Commerce. However, 
these organizations merely called for further studies, not necessarily for the freeway to be torn 
down. 
 
Policy Entrepreneurship 
 In contrast to the Park East teardown, what the Hoan Bridge teardown lacked was the 
vigorous support of a clear policy entrepreneur. Mayor Tom Barrett remained publically quiet on 
the matter, and there appears to have been no consensus amongst council members about the best 
course of action. 
 
“Do No Harm” Principle 
 Like the earlier proposal to tear down the east-west segment of I-794, the proposal to tear 
down the Hoan Bridge segment of the freeway posed both benefits and drawbacks. This segment 
of the freeway carried substantially less traffic than the downtown section of the freeway (less 
than the busiest part of Park East, in fact). And as HNTB’s traffic analysis showed, a boulevard 
replacement for the freeway would only result in a modest delay to commuters of a few minutes 
each way. The far greater concern for politicians and residents of Milwaukee’s southeastern 
suburbs was the teardown’s potential impact on the economic value that the freeway and Lake 
Parkway had created. So threatening was the proposal, that leaders representing communities in 
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the southeastern part of the county banded together to create the bipartisan Coalition to the Save 
the Hoan, which held public meetings, gathered signatures, and actively petitioned the 
governor’s office to reject the teardown proposal. 
 It can be noted here that teardown critics never actually showed that a boulevard would 
undercut the value that Lake Parkway had created. But the burden of proof was not on teardown 
proponents to demonstrate that a certain freeway or freeway segment is necessary; it was on 
teardown proponents to show that it that it is was not, which neither teardown proposal ever 
succeeded in doing. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The cases of Park East and I-794 support the idea that freeway removal efforts may need: 
(1) An adequate window of opportunity; (2) a strong advocate for the teardown option; (3) strong 
business support, and; (4) reasonable assurances from teardown proponents that the removal 
option will “do no harm.”  Second, it argues that the I-794 outcome can be partly explained by a 
major state investment in the freeway in the 1990s. The absence of these key conditions in the 
case of I-794 may help explain why the freeway was not torn down, although other factors may 
also have been at play. This thesis examined I-794 through the narrow lens of the teardown 
proposals themselves. An examination of relations between of urban-suburban relations as well 
as city-state relations may provide other clues as to why the I-794 teardown was rejected. 
Ultimately, this study uncovered another condition that future scholars may wish to 
consider: The absence of organized political opposition.  Opposition to Norquist’s Park East 
teardown proposal was relatively light, save for a last-ditch campaign by George Watts.  By 
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contrast, the campaign to save I-794 appeared to be well organized—especially when it came to 
saving the Hoan Bridge. 
Has I-794 at last cemented itself as a permanent part of Milwaukee’s built environment? 
Some Milwaukee-area leaders are planning for that scenario. In 2010, County Representative 
Patricia Jursik spearheaded the creation of a SEWRPC advisory committee predicated on an 
extension of Lake Parkway. In April 2012, this committee issued a formal recommendation that 
Lake Parkway be extended southward another six miles from its current terminus at Edgerton 
Avenue.8 This extension would save commuters approximately five minutes of travel time 
(reducing travel time in the corridor from 15 minutes to 10 minutes) and possibly reduce motor 
vehicle crashes in the corridor. But the parkway extension would run very near several dozen 
residential units, as well as 12 commercial or industrial buildings and 20 acres of parkland and 
27 acres of wetlands—all to the tune of more than $207 million.9 More than 20 percent of the 
parkway extension was forecasted to handle less than 9,000 vehicles per weekday.10 Despite the 
projected impact and low demand for such a facility, SEWRPC added the parkway to its regional 
transportation plan in June 2014.11 
                                                
8. Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, Study of a Lake Parkway (STH 793) Extension 
from Edgerton Avenue to STH 100 in Milwaukee County, Memorandum Report No. 201, April 2012, 
http://bit.ly/1VC8AEr. 
9. Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, Study of a Lake Parkway (STH 793) Extension 
from Edgerton Avenue to STH 100 in Milwaukee County, Memorandum Report No. 201, April 2012, 14-15, 
http://bit.ly/1VC8AEr. 
10. Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, Study of a Lake Parkway (STH 793) 
Extension from Edgerton Avenue to STH 100 in Milwaukee County, Memorandum Report No. 201, April 2012, 14, 
http://bit.ly/1VC8AEr. 
11. The Lake Parkway extension may not be built any time soon, however. SEWRPC has noted that the 
total estimated cost of its 2035 transportation plan “exceeds the existing and reasonably expected revenues available 
to implement the plan” and therefore created a “fiscally-constrained” version of its plan. This version retained all of 
the arterial expansion projects recommended in the original full plan with the exception of Jursik’s Lake Parkway 
extension. See: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, Review and Update of the Year 2035 
Regional Transportation Plan, Memorandum Report No. 215, June 2014, 4, 113, http://bit.ly/1Ok0mfW. 
Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, Review and Update of the Year 2035 Regional 
Transportation Plan, Memorandum Report No. 215, 4, http://bit.ly/1Ok0mfW.  
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Throughout the planning process, neither SEWRPC nor Jursik’s task force clearly 
articulated what problem this new highway was intended to solve.12 A press release from Jursik 
in December 2012, however, hinted at the purpose behind the extension. “An extended Lake 
Parkway will provide the necessary transportation infrastructure to promote economic 
development in Milwaukee County’s South Shore and around the Port of Milwaukee and 
General Mitchell International Airport,” she wrote. “We are part of the increasingly powerful 
lake corridor mega-region that stretches from Gary, Indiana through Chicago, Illinois to Ozaukee 
County, Wisconsin.”13 But in an age of growing environmental concerns, does it make sense to 
build a $207 million highway that solves no existing transportation problem in the hopes that it 
will spur (car-dependent) development further afield from the City of Milwaukee? It is a 
question I leave to the reader. 
Despite the recent reconstruction and re-decking of I-794, the debate over the future of 
the freeway may not be over yet. In about 40 years’ time, the piers and supports holding up the 
Hoan Bridge, which are original to the freeway’s 1970s construction, will reach the end of their 
structural lifespan, necessitating a full reconstruction of the bridge. At about the same time the 
east-west section of the freeway will also need major maintenance. Such work is anticipated to 
cost billions of dollars. Will the State of Wisconsin pay for a complete reconstruction of the 
bridge? Or will is opt for a less-expensive roadway? The answer to that question may very well 
depend on which scenario is planned for by state and local leaders.
                                                
12. Meeting minutes indicate the committee spent most of its time discussing road design details and 
intersection treatments. See: Southeastern Wisconsin Planning Commission, Minutes of the First Meeting, Advisory 
Committee on the lake Parkway Extension Study, August 26, 2010, http://bit.ly/1OiE6Bt; Second Meeting, October 
28, 2010, http://bit.ly/1LgbVOk; Third Meeting, February 16, 2011, http://bit.ly/1LgbVOk; Fourth Meeting, June 
13, 2011, http://bit.ly/1Z8eZX2; Fifth Meeting, September 26, 2011, Sixth Meeting, November 14, 2011, 
http://bit.ly/1Z8fgJQ; Seventh Meeting, March 26, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LgiYeg. 
13. Milwaukee County Press Release, Supervisor Patricia Jursik, December 5, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LgtGNq.  
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Table 3 Summary of Findings 
 
Park East 
Freeway 
(1989-1999) 
I-794 
East-West segment 
(c.1992-1999) 
 
I-794 
Hoan Bridge segment 
(2008-2011) 
Were there 
integrity & safety 
Concerns? 
 
 
No. The freeway was 
aging but in no danger of 
collapsing and had many 
years of service life ahead 
of it. 
No. The freeway was 
aging but in no danger of 
collapsing and had many 
years of service life ahead 
of it. 
Yes. By 2008, the freeway 
was structurally sound but 
rapidly deteriorating. 
Safety nets were installed 
to catch falling concrete. 
 
Was there a 
window of 
opportunity? 
 
 
 
 
Yes. A downtown stadium 
was the initial window. 
Later, the window became 
the downtown planning 
process, augmented by the 
potential availability of 
federal funds for the 
project. 
 
Partially. The window was 
similar to that of Park 
East, but also included the 
planned reconstruction of 
the Marquette Interchange. 
The impending opening of 
Lake Parkway complicated 
this window. 
Partially. The window was 
the freeway’s deteriorating 
condition and the HNTB 
study recommending a 
boulevard replacement for 
the freeway. Recent 
development resulting 
from Lake Parkway 
complicated this window. 
 
Was there strong 
business support? 
 
 
 
 
No. This support came 
from developer Gary 
Grunau, the business 
improvement district he 
chaired, and Harley-
Davidson. Some 
opposition was expressed 
by George Watts and 
others. 
 
No. There was some 
support from business 
interests in the City of 
Milwaukee, but not in the 
suburbs. 
No. There was some 
support from business 
interests in the City of 
Milwaukee, but not in the 
suburbs. 
Was there policy 
entrepreneurship? 
 
No. The teardown option 
originated within and the 
Norquist administration. 
Norquist and others 
lobbied for a boulevard 
replacement. 
 
No. The teardown option 
originated within and the 
Norquist administration. 
Norquist and others 
lobbied for a boulevard 
replacement. 
No. Mayor Barrett was 
publically quiet on the 
issue and there does not 
appear to have been any 
consensus among 
councilmembers. 
 
Did the teardown 
promise to “do no 
harm”? 
 
 
No. The major concern 
among project 
stakeholders was traffic 
congestion; Norquist 
addressed his concern with 
a traffic modeling. 
No. The major concerns 
among stakeholders were 
traffic congestion and the 
teardown’s impact on the 
economic value of Lake 
Parkway; Neither of these 
concerns were addressed 
by teardown proponents. 
 
No. The major concern 
was the teardown’s 
potential impact on the 
value created by Lake 
Parkway. This concern 
was not addressed by 
WisDOT’s teardown 
proposal. 
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Appendix 
A view of downtown Milwaukee (top) c.1964 and the planned downtown freeway loop (bottom).  Source: Howard, 
Needles, Tammen and Bergendoff, Milwaukee’s Downtown Freeway Loop – Key to the Future, Milwaukee, WI: 
Milwaukee County Expressway Transportation Commission, c.1964. 
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A map of Milwaukee County’s active expressway projects and approved routes in 1960. Source: Milwaukee County 
Expressway Commission, Annual Report, 1960, 3. 
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A map of Milwaukee County’s active expressway projects and approved routes in 1968.  Source: Milwaukee County 
Expressway Commission, Annual Report, 1960, n.p. 
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A map of planned and committed expressway routes in Milwaukee County, as well as those recommended by the 
Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission in 1966. Source: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional 
Planning Commission, Recommended Regional Land Use and Transportation Plans, Planning Report No. 7, Vol. 3 
(1966), 28. 
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